

**Hybrid Power:
Mobility Air Forces and Foreign Policy**

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

HYBRID POWER: MOBILITY AIR FORCES AND FOREIGN POLICY by Major Russell O. Davis, USAF, 58 pages.

United States foreign policy is undergoing a metamorphosis, creating conditions that require a whole of government integrated foreign policy approach. Current methodology attempts to use all aspects of the United States' instruments of power in a separate, but complementary manner to influence the global security environment. To address these challenges, President Obama's foreign policy strategy is built upon the concept of smart power. Smart power is the nexus of soft and hard power via the different instruments of national power to positively influence foreign policy.

The basis of the research question for this monograph is to analyze the potential for military forces, Mobility Air Forces (MAF) in particular, to contribute to foreign policy in other than hard power methods. This monograph asks: what contribution, if any, does the USAF's Mobility Air Forces have in the execution of smart power in United States foreign policy? The hypothesis of this monograph is that the military, particularly MAF, can contribute both positively and negatively to the hard and soft power elements of foreign policy. This hypothesis also challenges the Center for Strategic and International studies (CSIS) categorization of separate but complementary soft and hard power as smart power and asks if there is a better way to approach those activities to further United States policy.

This monograph introduces a method of better capturing the interaction of hard and soft power termed "Hybrid Power." Hybrid power captures the essence of simultaneity as hard and soft power is exerted by a single element to create the desired foreign policy effects. The term hybrid power also eliminates the politically charged and divisive term, "smart power." In order to capitalize on the potential that hybrid power has in influencing foreign policy, the entire paradigm of smart power must shift from separate, somewhat disconnected activities towards fully integrated and simultaneous activities. Identifying those activities as hybrid power indicates an evolution in the understanding of how the different elements of hard and soft power integrate.

The USAF's Mobility Air Forces are a good example of the military's hybrid power potential to positively influence today's complex foreign policy environment. This paper includes a short history and description of MAF, and it contrasts MAF capabilities and outcomes against the CSIS critical aspects of smart power. Historical case study is used to ascertain the origins and development of MAF in relation to foreign policy and how their activities relate to hybrid power theory.

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The acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting
- Sun Tzu

INTRODUCTION

United States foreign policy today is arguably more complex than any other time in history. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the advent of globalism, and terrorist threats from non-state ideological actors all contribute to this complexity. Because of these and other factors, United States foreign policy is undergoing a metamorphosis, creating conditions that require a whole of government integrated foreign policy approach. Current methodology attempts to use all aspects of the United States' instruments of power in a complementary manner to influence the global security environment.

The U.S. State Department labels the nexus of the different instruments of national power in foreign policy as “smart power.” According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), smart power is “~~neither~~ hard nor soft power—the skillful combination of both.”¹ At a recent town hall meeting at Moscow State University, Secretary of State Clinton stated:

—...here are two kinds of power. There is hard power, namely military power and [the ability to] deploy in preparation for military power. On the other hand, there is soft power, which is diplomacy and development aid and people-to-people cultural contact. I think that's a false choice in the 21st century. I think that it is more appropriate to look at the range of threats and challenges we face to recognize that it is rare [to have an] either/or [approach]. And so several years ago, academics in our country began writing about what they called smart power; in other words, using the tools at their disposal to address whatever problems [exist], and of course, trying to err on the side of avoiding the use of hard power wherever possible, using diplomacy and other approaches to try to prevent having to use military force.”²

In order to understand the smart power approach to foreign policy, one must look at its components, soft and hard power. Joseph Nye first introduced soft power in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead*.³ His initial thoughts on soft power focused on exporting United States culture and values. Later,

¹Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007), 7.

² Transcript of Secretary of State Clinton's Remarks at Moscow State University, Russia, Oct 14, 2009. See State Department, Town Hall at Moscow State University, available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130567.htm> (accessed Nov 6, 2009).

³ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books Group, 2004), XI.

Nye clearly captured his theory in his book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.⁴ He defined soft power as the “ability to get what (one) wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” According to Nye, the military has a tertiary role in soft power; soft power primarily comes about because of the legitimacy and success of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies. Hard power on the other hand, is the ability to coerce another nation through the use of quantifiable instruments of national power.⁵ According to Nye’s categorization, economic sanctions and the military fall squarely into the hard power component of smart power. The definition provided by Nye fails to consider elements of the United States military that do not engage in lethal operations on a regular basis. Some of those, such as Civil Affairs, the Medical Corps, and Mobility Air Forces (MAF) are by definition hard power United States military forces that have the potential to contribute to the soft power element of smart power.

An analysis of the potential for military forces to contribute to foreign policy is the basis of the research question for this monograph. That question is: what contribution, if any, does the USAF’s Mobility Air Forces have in the execution of smart power in United States foreign policy? The hypothesis of this monograph is that the military, particularly MAF, can contribute both positively and negatively to the soft power elements of foreign policy. This hypothesis also challenges CSIS’ categorization of complementary soft and hard power as smart power and asks if there is a better way to approach those activities to further United States policy. America’s Mobility Air Forces provides a strong example of how foreign policy can be furthered by simultaneous and integrated hard and soft power employment.

Simultaneity in soft and hard power projection is not something new to Mobility Air Forces. This development occurred due to the evolution of air mobility capability, and the results have varied throughout the execution of foreign policy. One of the most notable early demonstrations of this

⁴ Nye, 5-10.

⁵ The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2007) I-8-I-10.

capability took place during China-Burma-India, “The Hump” operations in World War II. The Allies used MAF in a smart power manner by transporting both humanitarian aid to the affected population, as well as delivering forces and ammunition to the fight against the Japanese.⁶ Another example of MAF’s ability to influence foreign policy occurred during —Operation Vittles,” otherwise known as the Berlin Airlift. Air Force transport aircraft furthered the United States policy of Communist containment without firing a shot. Soft power came into its own during the Berlin Airlift, as mobility aircraft carried over two million tons of supplies in 270,000 flights, solidifying Western resolve towards the prevention of communist expansion. The demonstration of soft power during the Berlin Airlift did something else—it brought hope to a generation of Germans facing the threat of communist oppression. That hope translated into a strong German support base for the United States throughout the Cold War. While the examples depicted above portray MAF’s positive effects on foreign policy, not all MAF activities share the same results.

One example of the unintended consequences of MAF implementing soft power foreign policy took place towards the end of the Vietnam War. What began as a positive example of MAF’s impact on foreign policy turned tragic. On 4 April 1975, shortly after takeoff, a C-5 Galaxy aircraft transporting 243 orphaned Vietnamese children had a catastrophic door failure.⁷ The failure resulted in the destruction of the aircraft, killing 138 people, including 78 children, most of whom were located in the main cargo compartment.⁸ Had it not been for the heroic efforts of the flight crew that day, all on board would have been lost. The mission, touted as —Operation Baby Lift,” was designed to bolster world opinion of American efforts in South Vietnam during the withdrawal of United States forces. Unfortunately, as a result of the airlift accident, the effort was recorded as an image of dead and injured children next to a destroyed American transport. Overall, Operation Baby Lift was a success, resulting in the relocation of

⁶ Referring to the whole of the Air Force global mobility system as MAF started early in the twenty-first century. In WWII, these forces were referred to as transport aircraft. Additional information on the evolution of MAF is available later, in the section entitled *Understanding the MAF*.

⁷ C-5 Losses. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/c-5-loss.htm> (accessed Jan 1, 2010).

⁸ Col (Ret) Bud Traynor, Twelve Minutes Out, *Airlift Tanker Quarterly*, volume 13, No. 2, (Spring 2005), available at http://www.atalink.org/atq/ATO_Spring_2005.pdf (accessed Jan 1, 2010), 6-13.

over 3,300 orphaned Vietnamese children to families in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. Properly employed, Mobility Air Forces can enhance United States foreign policy through soft and hard power by legitimizing United States motives in the eyes of others. Improperly employed, MAF operations can have deleterious effects to foreign policy and world opinion.

This paper challenges the notion that military forces fall only into the hard power bucket of foreign policy by asserting that elements within the United States military, namely Mobility Air Forces, play a significant soft power role in the implementation of United States foreign policy. It also takes a deep look at issues related to Mobility Air Force's ability to influence foreign policy: overflight and basing, airframe limitations and the conditions/context for successfully employing MAF to further foreign relations. Lastly, this paper introduces a new term into the foreign policy lexicon: hybrid power. The term hybrid power describes the capability to integrate simultaneous soft and hard power methods on a single platform, or capability that positively influences United States foreign policy in a clear and non-divisive manner.

Methodology

Section one begins with a short history of Mobility Air Forces, their capabilities, limitations and employment. This foundational knowledge aids in understanding the evolution of MAFs interrelationship with other instruments of national power and their role in the implementation of soft and smart power in foreign policy. The second part of section one identifies the theoretical elements of smart power and confirms or refutes any correlation those elements have with MAF employment or development. The relationship between the components of smart power and the USAF MAF illustrate the impact (both positive and negative) non-lethal military forces have on foreign policy and relations. The third section identifies the relevance of smart power in today's environment via an analysis of the current administration's theoretical construct for United States foreign policy. The fourth part of section one introduces the term —Hybrid Power,” describing what it means and it's usage to illustrate the positive effects MAF can have on foreign policy. Lastly, a look at the military's role in the implementation of

foreign policy shows the linkages between military activities and the different foreign policy methodologies. This part adds clarity to understanding where military activities fall in the foreign policy spectrum. The linkage between the military and foreign policy must be explored to fully understand their role in the implementation of that policy.

Section two utilizes the historical case study method to examine the evolution of MAF's contributions to foreign policy. The foundational case studies are China-Burma-India "The Hump" operations and the Berlin Airlift. These historical case studies examine if MAF's contribution to foreign policy are hard, soft, or hybrid power and whether they are a recent revelation or something that has been an integral aspect of operations from their early days. Additionally, these case studies test the hypothesis that MAF can both positively and negatively influence elements of foreign policy.

Following the historical case studies, section three begins by conducting a review of current doctrine to elucidate the military's understanding of MAF contributions to foreign policy. The doctrinal review is useful to determining the military documented understanding of MAF's involvement in the implementation of foreign policy. The next part analyzes two modern examples of MAF operations and the positive and negative affects those events had on foreign policy. Those operations are Operation ENDURING FREEDOM humanitarian daily ration airdrops and the 2005 Pakistani earthquake relief. This analysis is useful in determining the nature of the future of MAF operations on foreign policy

The final section of the monograph provides conclusions and recommendations. It answers the question of how the USAF's Mobility Air Forces effectively contribute to hybrid power in United States foreign policy. Additionally, this section prescribes several recommendations that outline how MAF can positively contribute to foreign policy in the future and areas for further study. The intent is to demonstrate why and how hybrid power theory is a better fit for the description of the interactions between hard and soft power and how MAF activities are illustrative of that interaction.

SECTION ONE: MAF, THE MILITARY, AND FOREIGN POLICY

Understanding the Mobility Air Forces (MAF)

In order to understand the interaction of MAF with foreign policy one must have a basic knowledge of their organizational evolution, command structures, composition of forces currently used and how they are tasked to perform various functions. The gradual realization of the efficacy of a centralized MAF did not take place overnight. The concept of a consolidated American Mobility Air Force is relatively new and has come about because of a 50-year evolution in the understanding of the employment of transport and tanker aircraft. The consolidation that resulted from the evolution has produced a command structure capable of meeting the United States' rapid global mobility needs. Knowledge of the centrally organized, trained and equipped MAF command structure is vital to effectively employing those forces to influence foreign policy. Additionally, a brief explanation of force composition illustrates the types of capabilities and limitations that apply to MAF in the execution of hybrid power. Lastly, one must understand how a need for earthquake assistance or humanitarian aid moves from concept to the delivery of goods on the ground. The tasking process is important to understanding how to best employ the limited MAF assets available. All of this information aids in understanding the path that the United States has taken to have the most capable air mobility system on the globe, able to influence foreign policy on a moment's notice.

In March of 1941, General Hap Arnold laid the groundwork of formalizing the existing decentralized employment of MAF by establishing the Air Corps Ferrying Command. General Arnold's intent behind the Ferrying Corps was to free up British pilots from moving aircraft purchased under the Lend-Lease Act and to provide a training opportunity for American pilots.⁹ The Ferrying Command quickly outgrew the mission and structure the Air Corps put in place and in June 1942, the Army Air Corps created the Air Transport Command (ATC). By the end of World War II, ATC had over 200,000

⁹ W. F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 313.

people, possessed approximately 3,700 aircraft, and represented the global nature that airlifters had on transport operations. In an effort to consolidate all air transport activities within the military, the DoD (Department of Defense) stood up the Military Air Transport Service (MATs) in 1948. The Secretary of Defense mandated that MATs maintain and operate all air transport required by the armed forces and national military establishment. However, tactical airlift and initial supply/resupply of units in forward combat areas were excluded from the MATs charter.

The exclusion proved contentious, because of the need for centralized ownership of the tactical airlift mission due to the limited number of aircraft designated to perform that mission. Subsequently, the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC) became the ad hoc manager for a majority of tactical airlift operation planning and execution. In December 1956, the DoD published directive number 5160.2, designating the Secretary of the Air Force as the single manager of airlift service for the entire United States military. Prior to this directive, other branches within the DoD had the authority to procure and operate their own airlift fleets. Shortly thereafter, the DoD approved MATs to serve as the ~~single~~ manager operating agency for airlift service.¹⁰ Additionally, a report published by the DoD in April 1960 recommended that MATs be prepared to employ tactical units in times of emergency. Based upon these two activities, MATs took on partial responsibility of tactical airlift operations (with TAC still owning the majority of the tactical airlift assets) with the acquisition of the C-130 aircraft. While the debate about ownership of tactical airlift was ongoing, the air-refueling mission was taking place daily with Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command owning those assets (820 C-135 refueling aircraft were built for the Air Force).¹¹ This is significant because the air-refueling mission encompassed a significant capability that would eventually flow into the MAF construct. With growing responsibilities, the USAF re-designated MATs as the Military Airlift Command (MAC) on 1 January 1966, a command designation that would last until after the end of the Cold War.

¹⁰ See Richard Irving Wolf's discussion of Department of Defense Directive Number 5160.2, Single Manager Assignment for Airlift Service, 7 December 1956. Richard I. Wolf, *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions* (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 303.

¹¹ Colin Bakse, *Airlift Tanker: History of United States Airlift Tanker and Forces* (Nashville: Turner Publishing Company, 1995), 80.

The next significant evolution to MAF took place in 1974 with the consolidation of all DoD (except Navy Carrier Onboard Delivery and Marine KC-130 aircraft) airlift under MAC, to include the Tactical Air Command's C-130 fleet.¹² The final significant organizational change for the MAF took place in 1992 with the re-designation of MAC to Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the integration of SAC and TAC's huge air refueling fleet of KC-135s. According to the Air Mobility Command's History Office:

A new era in air power history began June 1, 1992 when the Military Airlift Command and the Strategic Air Command were inactivated and Air Mobility Command formed from elements of these two organizations. AMC melded a worldwide airlift system with a tanker force that had been freed from its commitments by the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹³

In 1993, shortly after the consolidation of all MAF forces, the USAF transferred the entire fleet of C-130 and C-21 airlift aircraft to Air Combat Command.¹⁴ This reorganization fractured the seamless consolidation of theater and strategic airlift assets, resulting in challenges to command, control and employment. Finally, in 1997, the USAF consolidated nearly all Mobility Air Forces with the return of Continental United States (CONUS) C-130 aircraft to Air Mobility Command. Major Phil Bossert (Headquarters United States Transportation Command) and Colonel David Todd (Headquarters Air Mobility Command) captured the benefit of having a consolidated air mobility system: "A seamless airlift system also involves no disruption in efficiency between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Thus, having a common standard of training, equipping, tactics, doctrine, support, and command enable a smoother interoperability of all air mobility forces, worldwide."¹⁵ Mobility Air Forces consist of

¹² For pertinent extracts regarding the airlift consolidation refer to PDM of 1974, see Wolf, *The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions*, 389, 391.

¹³ Mobility Command Public Affairs Office, *Air Mobility Command Fact Sheet* (December 2008), <http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=229> (accessed September 10, 2009).

¹⁴ Lt Col Chris Krisinger, "Towards a Seamless Mobility System: The C-130 and Air Force Reorganization," *Air and Space Power Journal Chronicles* (1995), available at, http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspi/airchronicles/apj/apj95/fal95_files/krising.pdf, 1.

¹⁵ Todd and Bossert, *Viewing Rapid Global Mobility as a Revolution in Military Affairs* (1995), available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc_archives/cc_archives1995-98.htm (accessed January 2, 2010).

the consolidation of all aircraft, Airmen and worldwide support structures that ensure unrivaled global reach for America, anytime, anywhere.¹⁶

Today, America's Mobility Air Forces are comprised of airborne refueling assets, airlift assets and air mobility support forces.¹⁷ These forces include tactical airlift airframes (C-130, C-27), strategic airlift airframes (C-17, C-5), airborne refueling airframes (KC-135, KC-10), operational support aircraft (Air Force One, C-9, C-20, C-21, C-32, C-37, and C-40) and the personnel that provide the global ground support system that underpins air mobility operations.¹⁸ Additionally, MAF includes the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), used to augment forces for large-scale contingency operations.¹⁹ The augmentation of CRAF is critical during times of crisis, because it enables the DoD to meet routine and surge commitments simultaneously.²⁰ Each of the military airframes are capable of transporting people and various sized cargo. The C-5 and C-17 can transport the largest oversized and outsized cargo.²¹ Additionally, nearly all United States and allies aircraft have increased range, flexibility and payload do to MAF airborne refueling platforms.²² MAF include active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Airmen and civilians.²³

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the combatant command with the overall responsibility for MAF. USTRANSCOM develops and directs the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project national security capabilities and provide responsive support of joint, United States government and the Secretary of Defense approved multinational and non-

¹⁶Lt Gen Vern M. Findley, "Right Effects, Right Place, Right Time--America's Air Mobility Arm," *Military Logistics Forum*, Volume 3, Issue 5 (June 2009), accessed at <http://military-logistics-forum.com/mlf-archives/112-mlf-2009-volume-3-issue-4/1001-right-effects-right-place-right-time-americas-air-mobility-arm.html> (accessed July 15, 2009).

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-17, *Doctrine for Air Mobility Operations* (Washington D.C.: 2009), VI-1.

¹⁸ Headquarters Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office.

¹⁹ CRAF are a voluntary contractual program where civil carriers agree to augment military airlift during a crisis in exchange for peacetime defense business. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1-11.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ **Oversize:** Cargo exceeding usable dimensions of 463L pallet but is less than or equal to 1090" length x 117" width x 105" height. **Outsize:** Exceeds oversize dimensions. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2006), 84.

²² *Force extension* is the air refueling of one tanker by another. This capability can be used whenever the fuel requirements of the escorting tanker and its receivers exceed the tanker's takeoff fuel capacity. Ibid, 45.

²³ Headquarters Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office.

governmental logistical requirements.²⁴ The air component of USTRANSCOM is Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the single manager of all United States Mobility Air Forces. AMC is composed of one numbered air force, Eighteenth Air Force (which has overall responsibility of all air mobility missions tasked to the wings), two expeditionary mobility task forces and two centers. The command and control (C2) of MAF is unique within the Air Force. Instead of the standard regional C2 of operations through an Air Operations Center, AMC plans and executes all global MAF missions at a single location. The 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) serves as the MAF air operations hub by planning and controlling tanker and transport aircraft operations around the world.²⁵

In order to understand how the MAF mission goes from concept to implementation, one must understand the tasking flow. The typical tasking flow for MAF starts with the National Command Authorities directing deployable personnel and/or materials to a specific location somewhere on the globe. USTRANSCOM then takes that tasking and determines the priority of the movement. If the movement is time critical, or not large enough to justify a Military Sealift Command vessel, USTRANSCOM tasks AMC to plan and execute the mission. Following that determination, the TACC then receives the tasking and identifies the wing with the capability and availability to move the required items/personnel. The wing receives the tasking and identifies the aircraft and aircrew to perform the mission. That crew (sometimes with as few as three Airmen) then performs the mission. The limited number of MAF aircraft and crews coupled with the strategic nature of their operations requires the high-level vetting process that eventually results in the movement of high priority cargo and personnel anywhere on the globe. The integrated global nature of the MAF tasking flow from the president down to the aircrew on the ground is illustrative of the military's impact on the implementation and effectiveness of United States foreign policy.

²⁴ United States Transportation Command, *Fact Sheet*, as of Apr 2009, available from <http://www.transcom.mil/organization.cfm> (accessed December 22, 2009).

²⁵ Headquarters Air Mobility Command Public Affairs Office, *Eighteenth Air Force Fact Sheet* (June 2007), <http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=231> (accessed December 22, 2009).

Smart Power Components and Their Relationship to Mobility Air Forces

The term smart power originated in a 2007 CSIS report entitled *Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*. This report focuses on how America can leverage power to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome.”²⁶ According to the report, in order to implement smart power, United States foreign policy must have an integrated strategy, a resource base and a soft and hard power tool kit. The report, co-chaired by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye makes five recommendations on critical areas on which America needs to focus to demonstrate smart power globally. Those critical areas are:

- Rebuilding the foundation to deal with global challenges through alliances, partnerships and participation in multinational institutions
- Developing a unified approach to global development
- Public diplomacy through the improvement of access to international knowledge and learning
- Economic integration in order to increase the benefits of global trade
- Addressing climate change and energy concerns through technology and innovation²⁷

These five critical areas primarily involve the civil side of United States power, but have a “whole-of-government” flavor to them.

Each of the smart power critical areas are addressed on an individual basis in order to determine whether MAF contributions are applicable. The first critical area in executing smart power, rebuilding alliances, partnerships and participation in multinational institutions is broken down into three sub-tasks. The subtasks are: renewing United States commitment to the UN, reinvigorating alliances, and working to erase any perception of American hypocrisy regarding the United States abiding by international standards.

The first two sub tasks--renewing United States commitment to the UN and alliance building--are

²⁶ Armitage and Nye, 6.

²⁷ Ibid, 5.

both directly applicable to MAF operations and employment. Many UN initiatives are dependent upon MAF forces to execute their required activities. For example, MAF forces have been the sole source of air transport for Rwandan African Union peacekeeping forces to the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan.²⁸ In 2005, USAF aircraft and personnel transported two brigades of Rwandan Defense Force troops and their equipment in an effort to assist in bringing stability to an otherwise volatile area of Africa.²⁹ MAF were tasked with this move because the capability to quickly transport these forces does not exist outside of the USAF. MAF also has a direct impact on the second task of reinvigorating United States alliances by transporting American leadership to high-level diplomatic meetings and through the sale and support of mobility aircraft to partner nations. The third sub-task; erasing perceptions of the United States not abiding by international standards, does not have direct or indirect applicability to MAF.³⁰ This sub-task is outside of the scope of MAF capabilities because it deals primarily with a growing perception that the United States no longer feels bound by international legal norms and standards. This perception exists because of the refusal of United States lawmakers to ratify numerous treaties that the international community has agreed upon (Convention on the Rights of the Child, Mine Ban Treaty, etc).³¹ The key players for sub-task three are lawmakers, diplomats and the American people.³² This sub-task may prove to be intractable to the United States government and people, resulting in increased importance of the first two sub-tasks. Overall, MAF's ability to participate in UN activities and build alliances contributes to this critical area of smart power, resulting in a positive impact to foreign policy.

The second critical area in the execution of smart power is for the United States to develop a unified approach to global development. The unification of global development involves building a foreign assistance framework across all departments and agencies of the United States government

²⁸ Eric Elliot, *Airmen begin Darfur airlift operations*, available at <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123131365> (accessed December 27, 2009)

²⁹ Donna Miles, "Airlift Support for Darfur Continues Strong as Rice Visits Region," *American Forces Press Service*, July 21, 2005, available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16584> (accessed March 24, 2010).

³⁰ Armitage and Nye, 29.

³¹ *Ibid*, 33.

³² *Ibid*.

designed to prioritize strategic objectives and direct resources. If properly managed, MAF can make a solid contribution as the preferred method of delivery of the United States unified approach to global development. A scenario, which demonstrates MAF contributions in this regard, involves a small developing third world country that is a perfect recruiting location for terrorists. A natural disaster causes water contamination, devastating the country, resulting in widespread famine. The United States resolves to come to the aid of that country through food distribution, water purification technology and medical aid. Since time is of the essence, a large USAF strategic airlifter is dispatched to numerous locations throughout America to acquire and upload equipment and personnel. Then, the entire package is flown nonstop, using several airborne refuelings, to the affected area. This effort results in lives saved. Additionally, the smart power critical area of global development has been advanced and the export of positive United States values is achieved. The impact of this type of operation is both local and global. Locally, affected citizens see the United States flagged aircraft offloading their lifesaving resources. Globally, if properly integrated into a strategic communications network, the dedication and resolve of the United States to assist a country in need will be observed by other nations. A clear example is the South Asian tsunami relief operations in 2005 that resulted in 106 airlift missions, delivering 2,768 passengers and 3,370 short tons of life-saving equipment to the victims of the 13 nations affected by the disaster.³³ Another example occurred in 2004 as strategic airlift and air refueling aircraft assisted in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by transporting the Libyan weapons program to an area where it was safely neutralized. These two examples support the assertion that MAF directly contributes to the execution of global development.³⁴

The third critical area of smart power is public diplomacy through the improvement of access to

³³ The death toll was approximately 143,600 in the region. Another three to five million people in South Asia and Southeast Asia were left without clean water, food, shelter, and sanitation. The American tsunami relief effort was called Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. By the time the operation was declared closed, aircraft operating in the Air Mobility Command system had flown a total of 106 missions to airlift 2,768 passengers and 3,370 short tons of cargo. For additional information see Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "2005 Year in Review," In *Historical Archives*, by Command Historian, Scott AFB: Command Historian, 2005.

³⁴ Between 24-28 Jan 04 a single C-17 aircrew from McChord Air Force Base, Washington, airlifted 70 short tons of materials used to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from Mitiga Airfield, Libya, to McGhee-Tyson Air National Guard Base, Tennessee. For additional information see Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office.

international knowledge and learning. According to CSIS, the intent of public diplomacy is to communicate with the people not the governments of foreign countries.³⁵ Mobility Air Forces do this every time they land in a foreign country and interact with the local nationals. Whether the interaction consists of offloading needed supplies or merely stopping for fuel, USAF MAF crewmembers are on the front line of this foreign policy initiative. MAF Airmen act as ambassadors of the United States government when they touch down on foreign soil and many of their missions place them within the realm of public diplomacy because of the locations and circumstances in which they travel. For many people around the world, the first view of an American or America's capabilities occurs when a large mobility aircraft unloads personnel and equipment dispatched to improve their quality of life. Furthermore, the materials unloaded are not necessarily from the United States, but resources from within their own country or region.

MAF's capability to influence the fourth critical area--economic integration to increase the benefits of global trade--is minimal. This critical area addresses the global trade market, not the import of humanitarian aid and assistance to countries in need. The vast majority of goods delivered to foreign nations by MAF are not of the consumer goods variety and do not influence the global trading system. However, MAF global operations and presence do result in economic stimulus to many nations that would otherwise not receive United States resources. For example, since 2001, MAF has operated the —Transit Center at Manas International Airport” near Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan as a key hub for air refueling and transport aircraft.³⁶ From 2001 to 2009, the American government paid between \$2.0 (2001-2006) and \$17.6 million (2007-2009) per year to occupy the base.³⁷ According to a 2008 fact sheet from the United States Air Force, in addition to rent, the air base contributed \$22.5 million for airport operations,

³⁵ Armitage and Nye, 47.

³⁶ Formerly Manas AB, name change was a result of the agreement to extend the lease to United States forces July 2009. Capt Ben Carroll, Executive Officer to the Commander, Transit Center at Manas International Airport, e-mail interview by author, 8 Feb 10, Fort Leavenworth, notes, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth.

³⁷ United States Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, *Joint Statement the United States and the Kyrgyz Republic on Coalition Airbase*, July 14, 2006, available at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/july_14_joint_statement_on_coalition_airbase.html (accessed February 5, 2010).

nearly \$500,000 for upgrades to the air control systems, and about \$24 million on local contracts and charity work—totaling \$63 million back to the Kyrgyz Republic.³⁸ In July 2009, the terms for United States operations were re-negotiated by the Department of State (DoS), resulting in a rent increase to \$60 million per year, as well as \$36 million to expand the airfield and \$30 million for new navigation equipment.³⁹ This example is representative of MAF operations economic impact on foreign nations.

Mobility Air Forces also have a tertiary impact in economic integration of global trade. Strategically, MAF are the method of choice the DoD uses to rapidly deploy forces globally in order to protect United States lives, property and commerce. The anywhere, anytime capability of MAF acts as an umbrella that ensures the viability of the global trade system that enables economic integration. The former Director-General of the World Trade Organization, Renato Ruggiero, discussed the critical role that the United States has in the global trading system:

For five decades, the United States has been the single largest economy in the world - an economy, moreover, which finds itself at the epicenter of world woven ever more tightly together by trade, investment, and technology. Simply put, United States economic gravity has been the "glue" holding the multilateral system together.⁴⁰

The military acts as America's enforcement arm of the global trading enterprise with MAF acting as one of the "emergency response" elements, in case of a significant disruption to that system. For example, within five days of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the first of 15,000 airlift operations touched down in Southwest Asia providing military forces in large part to secure the flow of oil from the Middle East.⁴¹ This rapid deployment was critical in hedging against the threat that Iraq's activities had on the global energy market. The unchecked disruption of energy products from the Middle East would have had

³⁸ United States Air Force, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, *Fact Sheet: Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan* available at <http://preview.afnews.af.mil/manas/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12682> (accessed February 10, 2010).

³⁹ Bruce Pannier, "United States, Kyrgyzstan Reportedly Draft New Deal On Manas," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty* (June 23, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Kyrgyzstan_Reportedly_Draft_New_Deal_On_Manass/1760682.html (accessed February 2, 2010).

⁴⁰ Renato Ruggiero, *World Trade Organization News: 1995-99 Speeches*, (Nov 18, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spr_e/washin_e.htm (accessed January 28, 2010).

⁴¹ Captain Phil Bossert, "Strategic Airlift Inefficiencies from Desert Shield/Storm to Vigilant Warrior," *Air & Space Power Journal*, 1995: available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/bossert.html> (accessed December 8, 2009).

a significant impact to the global economy.

The MAF plays a small part in the final critical area of smart power execution addressing climate change and energy concerns through technology and innovation.⁴² The DoD is America's largest single user (within the government) of fossil fuels, with aviation fuel being the most consumed oil product.⁴³ Subsequently, according to Air Mobility Command's Fuel Efficiency office, the Air Force is the Department of Defense's largest consumer of fuel, requiring sixty-four percent in fiscal 2008. Eighty-four percent of that went to aviation fuel and Air Mobility Command used fifty-two percent of that aviation fuel share.⁴⁴ As such, MAF consume the most fossil fuel within the DoD. Because of this fact, the USAF, in conjunction with MAF undertook two initiatives that address climate change and energy concerns through technology and innovation. The first is the development of a coal-derived synthetic blend of jet fuel tested by the C-17 strategic airlifter to be later used in all USAF aircraft.⁴⁵ Second, the Air Force Petroleum Agency is replacing expensive to refine and store JP-8 jet fuel in the three large Air Force transport aircraft (C-5, C-17 & C-130) with commercial fuel. Significant cost savings occur because moving to commercial jet fuel increases competition for United States government fuel contracts and lowers transportation costs by moving the fuel through commercial pipeline systems.⁴⁶ The DoD expects cost savings to exceed forty million dollars annually once the initiative has been fully implemented by the Department of the Air Force.⁴⁷ This evidence suggests that MAF does have a small impact on addressing

⁴² Armitage and Nye, 5.

⁴³ Edward C. Aldridge and Delores M. Etter, "Statement of the Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," *Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Defense Wide Research and Development*, Washington D.C.: United States Senate Armed Services Committee, June 5, 2001, available at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2001/010605aldretter.pdf> (accessed December 6, 2009), 8.

⁴⁴ Laura McAndrews, *Fuel efficiency among top priorities in AMC's energy conservation*, Oct 05, 2009, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123171233> (accessed Jan 28, 2010).

⁴⁵ C-17 Globemaster cargo aircraft, workhorse of the United States-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the military's biggest user of jet fuel, flew for the first time with a coal-derived synthetic blend as the only fuel on board. Anderson said jet fuel from coal produced 1.8 times more carbon dioxide between production and consumption as jet fuel from oil, but he said most of that additional amount could be captured during production of the synthetic fuel. Jim Wolf, "U.S. Air Force eyes alternative fuel, slashing CO2," *Reuters*, October 27, 2007: <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2640141120071029> (accessed January 30, 2010).

⁴⁶ Technical Sergeant Amaani Lyle, *Officials test commercial fuel to replace JP-8 fuel* (May 2009), <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123148345> (accessed Oct 2009).

⁴⁷ Lyle.

energy concerns through technology and innovation that is critical to smart power implementation.

Overall, Mobility Air Forces have a part to play in the implementation of smart powers five critical areas. The first three areas: rebuilding alliances, partnerships and participation in multinational institutions, developing a unified approach to global development and public diplomacy through the improvement of access to international knowledge and learning are functions that MAF perform on a daily basis. The final two critical areas: economic integration to increase the benefits of global trade and addressing climate change and energy concerns through technology and innovation are influenced by MAF through indirect and tertiary methods. Nearly every mission flown by MAF is strategic in nature and as such, directly affects the United States role and reputation around the world. The CSIS report on smart power is more than an academic critique of foreign policy; it has become the touchstone for the current administration's global engagement.

Smart Power, United States Foreign Policy and the Current Administration

In order to understand the relevance of smart power, an understanding of the foreign policy under the current administration is essential. President Obama's administration states that the United States foreign policy strategy is built solidly upon the concept of smart power. The DoS identified smart power as its foundational concept on several key policy documents and statements. According to a recently published DoS fact sheet on smart power:

—Military force may sometimes be necessary to protect our people and our interests. But diplomacy and development will be equally important in creating conditions for a peaceful, stable, prosperous world. That is the essence of smart power—using all the tools at our disposal.”⁴⁸

President Obama's stated foreign policy goals are outlined on the smart power fact sheet as:

- Keeping the American people, the nation and our allies secure
- Promoting economic growth and shared prosperity at home and abroad
- Strengthening our position of global leadership to protect the health of our planet and

⁴⁸ United States Department of State, *American —Smart Power” Diplomacy and development are the vanguard* (May 2009), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/sep/fs/2009/122579.htm> (accessed August 14, 2010).

expand human dignity and opportunity

- Protecting and advancing United States values⁴⁹

At a speech given to the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to smart power as using the right policies and tools in thinking and decision-making. She then identified the five specific policy approaches related to smart power in foreign policy. Those smart power policy approaches are: updating and creating vehicles for cooperation with our partners; pursuing principled engagement with those who disagree with the United States; elevate development as a core pillar of American power; integrating civilian and military action in conflict areas and leveraging key sources of American power to include economic strength and the power of our example.⁵⁰

Each of the approaches mentioned in Secretary Clinton's speech have direct linkages to the smart power critical areas outlined in the 2007 CSIS commission on smart power. In fact, the CSIS report is the foundation for many of the current administration's foreign policies. For example, Secretary of State Clinton linked the first critical area CSIS identified in executing smart power; rebuilding alliances, during an address to the Council on Foreign Relations. She remarked, "Our first approach is to build these stronger mechanisms of cooperation with our historic allies, with emerging powers and with multilateral institutions." Another example relates to the final CSIS critical area in smart power execution; climate change and energy concerns through technology and innovation. Later in her speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary of State Clinton stated, "Our administration is also committed to deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, with a plan that will dramatically change the way we produce, consume and conserve energy."⁵¹ Both of these examples illustrate how the current administration embraces the smart power theory articulated by CSIS. The relationship between smart power and the current administration shows that this concept of operations will frame foreign policy for years to come. The ability of the United States to rapidly deploy anywhere on the globe is vital and necessary to meet the

⁴⁹ United States Department of State.

⁵⁰ United States Department of State, "Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations," *Secretary of State Hillary Clinton*, July 15, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm> (accessed October 12, 2009).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

requirements of smart power foreign policy...that is where hybrid power comes in.

Hybrid Power...the Evolution of Smart Power

The concepts behind smart power are sound and likely produce positive results, strengthening the United States reputation in countries that maintained negative perceptions of recent foreign policy decisions. However, there are constricting and negative implicit and explicit meanings attached to the term —Smart Power.” Implicit to the theory of smart power is the assertion that previous foreign policies were not smart, or in effect, dumb power. This of course is not true in that the crafters of United States foreign policy are well-educated, thoughtful individuals with the best interest of America in mind. Using a politically divisive term like smart power to describe current United States foreign policy may alienate many within the foreign policy realm and does not fully describe the interactions between the hard and soft effects of the tools available to American leaders. The explicit meaning of smart power is in the construction of the theory, the combination of hard and soft power. The activities associated with smart power are packaged into separate, but discrete elements of instruments of power designed for use in conjunction with each other, not simultaneously. However, there are tools available to policy makers that have characteristics that perform both hard and soft power simultaneously. One such tool is the USAF’s Mobility Air Forces. A single mission performed by MAF has the potential to harness both soft and hard power simultaneously—thus hybrid power.

Merriam-Webster defines hybrid as —something that has two different types of components performing essentially the same function.”⁵² This monograph asserts that the seamless effects of non-lethal air mobility operations simultaneously demonstrate —hard” and —soft power” in action and personify hybrid power in foreign policy. Hybrid power describes the interaction of instruments of power that coalesce hard and soft power into one interconnected, interrelated activity. It captures the essence of simultaneity when hard and soft powers interact to create the desired effects without sounding politically charged, or being divisive.

⁵² Webster Online Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/netdict/hybrid> (accessed Feb 8, 2010).

The term hybrid power better frames the historical and current impact the military has in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. In order to capitalize on the potential that the military has in influencing foreign policy, the entire paradigm of smart power must shift from separate, somewhat disconnected activities towards fully integrated and simultaneous activities. Identifying those activities as hybrid power indicates an evolution in the understanding of how the different elements of hard and soft power integrate—MAF are only one of many examples of how this integration can take place. The USAF's Mobility Air Forces are a good example of the military's hybrid power that is influencing the complex foreign policy environment of today.

The United States Military and its Relationship to Foreign Policy

In order to analyze the potential contributions MAF has on United States foreign policy, one must understand the basic relationship between foreign policy and military activities. Evidence suggests that United States foreign policy is tied “hand in glove” to military activities. The first piece of evidence is a brief discussion of Walter Russell Mead's four modern American foreign policy schools of thought (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian).⁵³ Each of the schools of thought are introduced and contrasted with their relationship to military and MAF activities. Following the theoretical discussion, the current foreign policy situation in Afghanistan is used to illustrate the closely-knit relationship between military activities and foreign policy. The theoretical background coupled with concrete example support the assertion that MAF, as a military element, possesses the capability to implement and influence United States foreign policy.

Walter Russell Mead's four United States schools of thought for foreign policy--Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian are all dependent upon military strength and resolve to succeed.⁵⁴ According to Mead, each of these approaches to foreign policy has separate and distinctive characteristics. The Hamiltonian school of thought is an economically centered way of approaching

⁵³ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy And How It Changed The World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), XVII

⁵⁴ Nye, 139.

foreign policy. It calls for a “strong alliance between the national government and big business” resulting in an integrated global economy.⁵⁵ The ability of the Mobility Air Forces and the military to project power to protect American economic interests is central to the Hamiltonian school. The next school of thought, Jeffersonian, is more concerned with safeguarding American democracy than spreading democracy abroad.⁵⁶ Of the four approaches to foreign policy, Jeffersonian has the least interaction with a military force designed to project power and influence, such as the MAF. However, a strong domestic military capability is central to protecting democracy within the United States, because those forces dissuade foreign governments from attempting to coerce through military actions. The Wilsonian school, on the other hand, holds that the United States is morally obligated to spread its form of democracy and social values throughout the world. This form is closely related to the soft power method for foreign policy that Nye championed. The military and Wilsonian strategy coalesce due to the size and capabilities of military forces. The military sets the conditions for governmental change in foreign nations and often times is, the method of choice for the implementation of democratic reforms in those countries. Examples of the United States military’s involvement in the spread of democracy include: post WWII Germany and Japan, South Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. The final approach to foreign policy is the Jacksonian approach. Jacksonianism is a populist approach that according to Nye, “emphasizes self reliance and frequent use of coercion.”⁵⁷ This type of foreign policy puts the physical security and economic well-being of the American people in front of all other considerations. The military acts as the hedge, protecting American interests that are perceived to be, or actually are threatened. These four schools of thought shaped United States foreign policy from the first days of an independent America to today.⁵⁸ The diverse nature of each approach is indicative of the dynamic nature of American foreign policy and its relation to military activities.

⁵⁵ Mead, XVII.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Nye, 139.

⁵⁸ Mead, XVII.

Foreign policy in America changes over time, because according to Mead, “When it comes time to make foreign policy decisions, domestic political advisors have a prominent place at the table and in many cases, a decisive one.”⁵⁹ Evolving domestic situations are key elements to changing foreign policy priorities, which in effect, influence the employment of United States military Mobility Air Forces. Currently, America is moving from a Jacksonian approach, where foreign policy was driven by the events of September 11, 2001, to a more Wilsonian approach designed to rebuild America’s global image and reputation. The change is largely the result of current United States overseas contingency operations. One such operations, the conflict in Afghanistan, is illustrative of the current relationship military forces have with the implementation of foreign policy.

Foreign policy towards Afghanistan is undergoing a metamorphosis that is military centric. The current administration has spent the first ten months of their tenure studying the past eight years in Afghanistan to determine what needs to happen to align the situation with its desired outcome. On 1 December, 2009, President Obama formally announced the American foreign policy towards Afghanistan. In his speech, the President stated, “What’s at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world.”⁶⁰ This indicates the extremely important nature of the operations that are taking place in that region and the military’s preeminence in bringing about the desired results. Specifically, the President’s strategy to “bring the war to a successful conclusion” identified three key objectives:⁶¹

1. Deny Al Qaida a safe haven
2. Reverse the Taliban’s momentum
3. Strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces

⁵⁹ Mead, 52.

⁶⁰ Office of the President of the United States, "Afghanistan Grand Strategy, *President's Speech at West Point*, Washington DC: White House Press Secretary, Dec 1, 2009.

⁶¹ Ibid.

The method for enacting this strategy began with adding 30,000 troops to the area and increased funding for civil activities through other governmental agencies in the region. The movement of those 30,000 troops and their equipment to the conflict area is a MAF mission that has direct bearing on foreign policy.

The Afghanistan example serves to show the interrelationship between foreign policy and military activities. The methods used by the military to implement the president's goals encompass the entire gamut of hard and soft power. Certainly hard power is implicit to all three objectives, but soft power is also necessary if the United States is to reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny safe haven for Al Qaida. David Galula defines victory in an insurgency as the destruction of the insurgent forces (hard power) coupled with the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation maintained by and with the population (soft power).⁶² The isolation discussed by Galula is achieved by political, social, economic, and other reforms that can be achieved through soft power.⁶³ Mobility Air Forces provide a means to move materials and personnel to the Afghani population-an activity that is vital to hybrid power and the United States' success.

SECTION TWO: HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

The historical case study of the China-Burma-India operations and the Berlin Airlift serve to confirm the hypothesis that MAF have historically contributed to foreign policy. Each study starts with a short synopsis of the situation that drove the decision to use transport aircraft to affect the desired conditions. Next, each case study examines specific events that illustrate MAF's contributions to foreign policy. The first case study (China-Burma-India) demonstrates the inherent flexibility of MAF to influence the hard, soft and hybrid power elements of foreign policy. The second study (Berlin Airlift) illustrates the first and second order effects of the MAF on United States interests. Each of these case studies supports the hypothesis that MAF have positive and negative influences on the hard and soft power elements of foreign policy.

⁶² David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 54.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 55.

"The Beginning," China-Burma-India Hump Operations

This case study examines the hybrid power elements of the China-Burma-India –The Hump” airlift operations during World War II. As one of the earliest examples of MAF being used to further United States foreign policy, –The Hump” operations illustrate how MAF exercised hard and soft power simultaneously. This study also examines the concepts behind the airlift, challenges to the operation, unexpected consequences, and the overall effect –The Hump” had on foreign policy. The study also illustrates that MAF contributions to foreign policy are not a recent revelation, but something that has been an integral aspect of their operations from the beginning. Lastly, this case study aids in proving the hypothesis that MAF can influence elements of foreign policy through hybrid power.

The China-Burma-India (CBI) airlift served as the foundation for Allied victory on the Asian mainland during the war with Japan. Additionally, the airlift enabled American long-range bombers (B-29 Superfortress) to engage industrial targets on the Japanese mainland.⁶⁴ Allied victory did not look promising in March of 1942. Japanese forces were steadily advancing toward India, unchecked since the British expulsion from Burma in December of 1941. A basic objective of the Allied war plan was to retain China as an active combatant against the Japanese.⁶⁵ Resupply and reinforcement coupled with airpower were the keys to that strategy. The allied forces available to stop the Japanese advance were the remnants of Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces (ground) and Major General Claire Chennault’s American Volunteer Group (air). Both of those forces were cut off from ground resupply due to the British loss of their main supply route, the Burma road, which ran from Rangoon to Kunming.⁶⁶

(Map One)


⁶⁴ Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr., *Strategic Air War Against Japan* (Maxwell AFB: Airpower Research Institute, 1980), 20.

⁶⁵ Lt Col Charles E. Miller, *Airlift Doctrine* (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1988), 49.

⁶⁶ William H. Tunner, *Over the Hump* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office), 58.

Map One

CBI Theater and the Burma Road (Rangoon, Lashio, Kunming)



Source: Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume One: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 491

Allied leadership decided that a ground offensive to establish a new truck route in northern Burma would be too costly and time consuming. Instead, the Combined Chiefs agreed to a proposed offensive to recapture the main port at Rangoon and re-open the Burma Road. A key aspect of this offensive involved massive resupply with the Americans conducting airborne transport for the short-term until the port and associated roads were secure. Thus, CBI “The Hump” operations were born.⁶⁷ What the Combined Chiefs designated as a temporary operation until a permanent solution could be enacted, turned into the main re-supply effort for the China-Burma-India theater.


On 21 March 1942, President Roosevelt established the Assam-Burma-China Ferry command whose mission was to deliver equipment and supplies to British, American and Chinese forces and perform humanitarian flights supporting refugee and wounded evacuation from the combat area.⁶⁸ Airlift operations started immediately. A small fleet of C-46, C-47 and C-87 airlift aircraft transported personnel

⁶⁷ Leo J. Daugherty, *The Allied resupply effort in the China-Burma-India theater during WWII* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2008), 9-11.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

and materials that ranged from 500 pounds bombs and small arms to fuel, food and water supplies.⁶⁹ Toward the end of operations, transport aircraft exceeded 5,327 tons in a single 24-hour period.⁷⁰ All told, 776,532 tons vital to Chinese ground operations and the United States bombing campaign made their way through the air into China.⁷¹ The airway used to move people and goods to/from India and China was directly over the Himalayan mountain range. (Map Two) The path itself was very dangerous. Known by the aircrew that flew it as the aluminum trail, the 50 mile wide, 550-mile long path had the wreckage of over 400 transport aircraft to mark the way by 1944.⁷²

Map Two
CBI Supply Routes and “The Hump” airway to China



Source: Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI. The China-Burma-India Theater. United States Army in World War II* (Washington: United States Army Center for Military History, 1985).

MAF’s initial efforts to influence foreign policy started slow. Efforts to airlift supplies to the Chinese forces proved only partially successful. The Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek wanted 5,000 tons of airlifted resupply per month by August of 1942. In reality, the airlift fell far short of that

⁶⁹ Daugherty, 14.

⁷⁰ Tunner, 133.

⁷¹ India China Division, Air Transport Command, *Hump Express*, November 15, 1945, http://cbi-theater-9.home.comcast.net/~cbi-theater-9/hump_express/original111545.html (accessed February 2, 2010).

⁷² Tunner, 46-47.

goal, providing only 800 tons of fuel, ammunition, food and other needed items per month by the deadline.⁷³ General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, sent a message to the CBI commander, Lieutenant General Stillwell, indicating that the priority in theater must be towards rebuilding the Chinese army into a credible offensive force.⁷⁴ Despite the importance of the Chinese army, they would only get enough logistical support to prevent their collapse.⁷⁵ Further frustrating the Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts was President Roosevelt's relationship with the CBI's senior Airman, Major General Claire Chennault. Roosevelt insisted that Major General Chennault receive a guaranteed monthly minimum level of support to sustain and enlarge air operations.⁷⁶ Of particular interest was the build-up and sustainment of airborne combat operations against Japanese targets. Overall, the airlift priority given to Major General Chennault resulted in reducing the amount of resupply available for the Chinese ground troops. The reduced support Chiang received had a direct impact on his ability to engage the Japanese and Communist Chinese attempting to overtake China.

In 1943, "The Hump" operations expanded, taking on an additional hard power role. This expansion occurred because of the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision to begin the strategic bombing of the Japanese homeland.⁷⁷ The intent behind the bombing was to "defeat the enemy air force and to so weaken the Japanese capability and will to fight as to cause capitulation or permit occupation against disorganized resistance."⁷⁸ At the time, the only location available to conduct those operations was mainland China, the desired location of the Mariana Islands was not yet available. The operation, named project MATTERHORN, was designed to employ the newly fielded B-29 "Superfortress Bomber against Japanese targets." The logistics requirements for this operation were incredible. In addition to the heavy bomber airbase construction, all of the fuel, ordinance, food and support equipment required delivery via airlift. Deployed B-29s taking off from India transported bombs and fuel over "The Hump" in order to

⁷³ Daugherty, 12.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 17.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 18.

⁷⁷ Hansell, 19.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 19.

equip other B-29s for combat operations.⁷⁹ In fact, it took the resupply efforts of seven B-29s to get one fully loaded and fueled B-29 over a Japanese target.⁸⁰ The hard power effects desired from B-29 operations from China were ineffective primarily due to the high cost and low efficiency of airlifted logistics support. In March 1945, the final operation MATTERHORN mission was flown and the B-29s moved to the Mariana Islands where they could receive the logistics support needed to be effective.⁸¹ Operation MATTERHORN demonstrated that airlift is not the answer to all logistics problems and that the types and numbers of assets apportioned to accomplish the mission limit its utility. Nevertheless, proponents of Operation MATTERHORN, including President Roosevelt, who told Winston Churchill that “periodic bombing of Japan would have a tremendous morale effect upon the Chinese people” agreed that the cost was worth the benefit to United States foreign policy.⁸²

The impact of CBI airlift produced soft power effects that greatly influenced the outcome of the campaign. In September 1942, a report from China Defense Supplies outlining the conditions and results of the “Hump” operations illustrated the effect airlift was having on the Chinese people:

Mr. Lauchlin Currie, who has recently returned from China where he went as the President’s personal representative, says that no single factor has done more to buck-up the Chinese morale than the presence of the American Air Force.⁸³

Improving the morale of the combat troops in mid 1942 was critical to sustaining operations against the Japanese. The British expulsion from Singapore and Burma, coupled with the loss of the only land based re-supply route to Chinese forces had devastating effects on their will to continue fighting. Airlift, in any capacity, sustained their defense and ensured adequate re-supply was available to take the offensive.

According to a 1957 USAF historical study of CBI operations, aeromedical evacuation of casualties was the most important factor in sustaining morale for the combat troops engaged in operations against the

⁷⁹ Hansell, 20.

⁸⁰ Winton Close, *B-29s in the CBI – A Pilots Perspective*, *Aerospace Historian* 30, no. 1 (1983), 13, referenced in G. Scott Gorman, *Endgame in the Pacific: Complexity, Strategy and the B-29* (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2000), 22.

⁸¹ Gorman, 23.

⁸² Hansell, 19.

⁸³ Frank Sinclair, aviation technical adviser, China Defense Supplies, Inc., Memorandum re Air Transport System, Dinjan-Kuming, China, n.d. 51-52 attached to Willauer to Harris, letter, 23 September 1942

Japanese.⁸⁴ Also cited in the study was the fact that —Urtihistories and commanders memoirs make much of the fact that the regular appearance of supply aircraft overhead was a great encouragement to troops in Burma.”⁸⁵ The sustained morale of Chinese troops on the ground was a key element to the foreign policy of keeping China in the fight against the Japanese. The ability to influence hearts and minds through resupply demonstrated the soft power capabilities of early Mobility Air Forces.

The hard power effect airlift had on ally operations was also critical. Field-Marshal Viscount Slim, the British ground force commander remarked, —Most of us had long recognized that air transport could solve some of our worse problems.”⁸⁶ In 1942, United States transport aircraft moved thirteen thousand Chinese combat troops into action via the —The Hump.”⁸⁷ That activity and others like it greatly contributed to the success of the allies’ campaign that relied solely on air supply for sustainment and reinforcement. The impact American airlift pilots had on relations with British forces in the CBI was also positive. Field-Marshal Slim stated that air transport was —a outstanding achievement...the young American pilots of the Hump should be remembered with admiration and gratitude by their countrymen and their allies.”⁸⁸ The hard power activity of moving troops into combat also resulted in the soft power effect of influencing British opinion of United States values and culture—a solid example of the hybrid power MAF are capable of employing.

At the conclusion of the war, Lieutenant General William Tunner, the commander of the airlift operation saw a need to better integrate the Asian people and countries. He also recognized that there was a high potential for civil war in the Asian countries previously conquered by the Japanese and the lack of interconnectivity was a large part of that potential. General Tunner’s solution was the Orient Project; its intent was to connect the different peoples in the region through air transport to alleviate —the strife and

⁸⁴ Dr. Joe G. Taylor, *Air Supply in the Burma Campaigns* (Maxwell AFB: USAF Historical Studies, 1957), 141.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 144.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 143.

misery that is now taking place”.⁸⁹ The existing travel infrastructure in the region was non-existent or restrictively expensive and time consuming.⁹⁰ The Orient Project was designed to connect large cities in the region (Shanghai, Calcutta, Peking, Hanoi, Singapore, etc) via air transport to provide stability and shared understanding of those peoples and cultures.⁹¹ The aircraft, infrastructure, personnel and know how were already present because of “The Hump” operations. Just as the project was gaining steam, there was a strong calling from citizens in the United States to bring the troops home. That sentiment resulted in the end of Project Orient. Lieutenant General Tunner strongly believed that if the United States allowed Project Orient to take hold, the communist revolution in China would prove unsuccessful. He based this assertion on the fact that air transport would have increased communication, trade and the transfer of ideas within the region.⁹² His assertion is impossible to prove, but General Tunner demonstrated that MAFs capacity to transform and develop is as important as its capability to transport materials.

There were several lessons learned during “The Hump” operations that are applicable to future hybrid power activities. One lesson was the morale-boosting qualities airdrop provided when supplying troops in contact with the enemy.⁹³ In addition, the capability of airdrop served as the foundation for humanitarian airdrop in future operations. Air evacuation also became a key tenet to CBI airlift operations. During the siege of Imphal, an Indian city located near the India/Burma border, airlift was quintessential in moving British-Indian IV Corps supplies and reinforcements in while taking wounded out.⁹⁴ The movement of sick, wounded and extra personnel out of the combat zone did not place additional burdens on the transports since they would have otherwise returned to their home bases empty.⁹⁵ In fact, by moving out “extra mouths to feed,” the airlift requirements for the troops remaining lowered by 30 tons per day.⁹⁶ The lesson learned is that sometimes it is more cost effective to relocate

⁸⁹ Tunner, 150.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 136.

⁹¹ Ibid, 146.

⁹² Ibid, 150.

⁹³ Taylor, 75.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 81.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

those in need versus providing sustainment supplies via airlift. This operation demonstrated that airlift can accomplish both sustainment of military forces and relocation of non-combatants on a single mission— hybrid power personified. Overall, MAF activities were vital to building and maintaining a strong alliance with the Chinese nationalists, laying the foundation for United States foreign policy with Taiwan today.

This case study also illustrates a shortcoming of MAF in foreign policy. The limited availability of airlift in high demand operations can have possible negative effects due to unfulfilled agreements or needs with foreign governments. If the quantity of airlift required does not equal the amount available, a thorough priority system must determine who gets that airlift. Invariably, some needed airlift, somewhere on the globe, will not take place due to higher priority movements elsewhere. The shortfall of early air re-supply of Generalissimo Chiang's forces illustrates the potential for that to happen. Understanding the impact airlift has on foreign policy is essential to determining the priority given and forces allocated to perform the mission.

Leo J. Daugherty III, leading author and Command Historian for the United States Army's Accessions Command described "The Hump" operations as the "incubator of airlift operations that are today commonplace in the United States Armed forces."⁹⁷ The tireless efforts during this event demonstrate that non-lethal military operations could have a significant effect on the outcome of military activities while simultaneously furthering foreign policy. The efforts of the airlift crews in the CBI Theater set the stage for the next significant challenge MAF would undertake in the evolution of soft, hard and hybrid power employment. Only three years after the conclusion of "The Hump" operations, another opportunity for America's airlift to influence foreign policy appeared—The Communist blockade of Berlin.

MAF's First Soft Power Test, the Berlin Airlift

The previous case study illustrates the origins of MAF's contribution to the employment of soft and hard power. The airlift of CBI war fighting materials and personnel on the inbound legs and

⁹⁷ Daugherty, 1.

evacuation of wounded and non-combatants on outbound legs show the versatility MAF provides foreign policy planners. The Berlin Airlift case study looks specifically at MAF's ability to influence United States hybrid power through humanitarian airlift. Volumes are written about the efforts of USAF mobility aircraft in this endeavor. The following case study is not intended to re-iterate the details of the operation, but to give an overview and then identify specific events and effects that MAF had in the employment of hybrid power towards United States foreign policy goals. Additionally, this case study outlines the shortfalls, limiting factors and unintended consequences of employing a large fleet of MAF aircraft in the execution of foreign policy.

The Cold War was just beginning between Western and Soviet governments and the first volley in that event was a Soviet blockade of West Berlin on 19 June, 1948. The Soviets cut off all landlines of communication to and from the city in an effort to drive Western powers from the city and force their form of government on the remaining half of the German capital. With over 300,000 Soviet combat troops close to West Berlin, the situation for the United States and its allies was serious.⁹⁸ American leaders had three options in dealing with the isolation of West Berlin; withdrawal from the city, direct action to open the supply lines (which might provoke a war), or a negotiated settlement with the Soviets.⁹⁹

Prior to the blockade, land routes (roads and rail) from West Germany provided 15,500 tons of supplies daily to the people of West Berlin.¹⁰⁰ The survival level of tonnage required for the approximately 2.25 million inhabitants of West Berlin was 4,000 tons per day.¹⁰¹ Fortunately, the capability to deliver life saving supplies had been developed and tested during "The Hump" operations, where as much as 71,042 tons of supplies per month had been delivered via transport aircraft.¹⁰² In fact, the highest tonnage of supplies delivered in a single day during in the CBI theater was recorded on 1

⁹⁸ Gail Halvorsen, *The Berlin Candy Bomber* (Springville: Cedar Fort, 1997), 31: referenced in Richard Collier, *Bridge Across the Sky*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978) 52.

⁹⁹ Roger D. Launius and Coy F. Cross, *MAC and the Legacy of the Berlin Airlift* (Scott AFB, IL: Military Airlift Command Office of History Monograph, 1989), 17.

¹⁰⁰ Tunner, 159.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 116.

August, 1945 at 5,327 tons—over 1,300 tons more than the minimum needed in West Berlin.¹⁰³ The daily tonnage needed for the city of West Berlin was the first large scale test for the soft power capabilities MAF were to provide for the United States.

The Berlin Airlift or —Operation Vittles” started only 5 days after the initial Soviet blockade on 24 June 1948.¹⁰⁴ By July 1, Headquarters USAF assigned over 300 transport aircraft to deliver life sustaining materials for the people of West Berlin. Everything from heating coal to food and mechanical supplies was transported to West Berlin via airlift.¹⁰⁵ The aircraft assigned were much larger and more capable than those used in the —The Hump” operations. The fleet consisted primarily of the new C-54 —Skymaster” aircraft, capable of carrying almost four times as much as the World War II workhorse C-47 —Skytrain.”¹⁰⁶ The route to and from West Berlin consisted of three corridors, 20 miles wide, two inbound and one outbound from the city.¹⁰⁷ (Map Three)

¹⁰³ Tunner, 133.

¹⁰⁴ Brigadier General Joseph Smith, the commander of the Weisbaden Area Command during the start of the American supply effort is given credit for giving the Berlin Airlift the name —Operation Vittles.” Tunner, 158. Halvorsen, 33.


¹⁰⁵ Halvorsen, 33.

¹⁰⁶ Andrei Cherny, *The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Hour* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2008), 253.

¹⁰⁷ Tunner, 157.

Map Three

Air Corridors used during the Berlin Airlift




Map Courtesy of the TrumanLibrary.com

Getting the minimum amount of supplies into the city required a constant high volume of airlift operations. General Tunner, the commander of the Combined USAF-RAF Airlift Taskforce, instituted deconfliction procedures that enabled aircraft to land every three minutes. (Illustration One) At the peak of airlift operations, MAF were able to move 5,620 tons on average per day.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Tunner, 207.

Illustration One

Cross-sectional view of flights into Berlin in September 1948.



Credits - United States Air Force Museum

In addition to delivering food and coal to the city of West Berlin, MAF demonstrated to a former enemy that freedom over communist oppression outweighs past experiences. One of the noteworthy aviators during the airlift was “The Candy Bomber,” Lieutenant Gail Halvorsen. After his first delivery of materials to West Berlin, Lieutenant Halvorsen made an astute observation regarding the relations between the two peoples:

—Suddenly realized that the closest man to me had his hand extended to me for a handshake and the one behind him was raising his hand for the same purpose. Then I noticed the look in their eyes as they gazed at the flour bags [I had just delivered], then back to us, as though we were angels from heaven delivering the news of the resurrection. There was an expression of humble gratitude through body language, the tone of unintelligible greetings, the moist eye and the sincere thrusting forward of the hand of friendship.”¹⁰⁹

Not only were the crews and aircraft of the Mobility Air Forces providing life saving materials for West Berlin, those crews were also the face of freedom, representing the values of the American people. Those representative values not only underpinned the soft power element of United States hybrid power in the generation unloading Lieutenant Halvorsen’s aircraft, but the younger generation as well.

The children of West Berlin were suffering greatly due to the Soviet blockade. They had just lived through the destruction of their city, deaths of family members and were now contending with hunger. The food situation was bad, the targeted daily food rations the airlift was attempting to provide was 1834 calories for children nine to fourteen years old; compared to the average United States caloric

¹⁰⁹ Halvorsen, 59.

intake of 2700 for the same age bracket.¹¹⁰ Driving around the city, Lieutenant Halvorsen weaved in and out of rubble-strewn streets, observing gutted buildings without roofs or windows and twisted webs of girders across bombs craters that covered the city like small pox scars.”¹¹¹ Lieutenant Halvorsen saw a need to give the children of West Berlin hope and chose to fill that need through airdropping candy from his C-54 while over the city during approach and landing. The effort, known worldwide as “Operation Little Vittles” and was key to restoring the hope of freedom for future generations of Germans.¹¹² Over the course of ten months, twenty-three tons of candy and toys were delivered by tens of thousands of parachutes dropped from C-54’s to the children of Berlin.¹¹³ In fact, the children of East Berlin sent a letter to Lieutenant Halvorsen requesting that some candy be dropped on their side of the city:

—Is there any chance that you could drop these packages to us in East Berlin when you make your approach into Templehof? We see your wings wiggle and the packages come down. There are parks and schools that would make good targets over here and there aren’t as many people...”¹¹⁴

Lieutenant Halvorsen and his crew assembled a special load of candy and the children of East Berlin were given a taste of the promise of freedom. Lieutenant Halvorsen captured the essence of what Operation Little Vittles was about by stating that, —Some children would turn their attention from the grey of the winter and the tightness of the Red stranglehold on their city to remember better days and hope for a better future.”¹¹⁵ Not only were the people of West Germany influenced by United States hybrid power, but the entire world watched as Western resolve defeated Communist strategy by demonstrating what America could do with its military without firing a shot.

Numerically, the Berlin Airlift was a monumental feat. Within six months of beginning the airlift, the average daily ration for a West Berliner increased from 1,600 calories to 1,880 calories and that

¹¹⁰ Aviation Operations Magazine, *A Special Study of Operation "Vittles"* (New York: Conover-Mast Publications, 1949), 16.

¹¹¹ Halvorsen, 106.

¹¹² Ibid, 113.

¹¹³ Pamela Feltus, *United States Centennial of Flight Commission, —The Berlin Airlift,* ” http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/berlin_airlift/AP35.htm, (accessed Jan 09, 2010).

¹¹⁴ Halvorsen, 132.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 150.

despite the added requirements for heating coal during the winter.¹¹⁶ Towards the end of the blockade on 16 April, 1948, 12, 940 tons of needed materials were flown into West Berlin (the equivalent of 600 railway cars).¹¹⁷

The airlift also had a solid economic impact on Western Europe. In addition to the materials going into the city, goods produced for commerce were exported via the airlift. Overall, 81,730 tons of exported goods made it out of West Berlin, providing a conduit for the ever-increasing financial security of the West Germans. General Lucius D. Clay remarked that:

—Economically, the Airlift has been costly, but at the same time it has demonstrated the fact that America is firm in its course to establish a sound economy for Europe. As a result, the Germans in the Western areas of Germany have begun rebuilding.”¹¹⁸

One of the detractors of the airlift, as with any large MAF operation, was the cost associated with moving vast quantities of material over long distances. The official estimate for the American contribution to the Berlin Airlift was \$300,000,000—approximately \$150 per ton of goods moved into the city.¹¹⁹ The twenty-four hour a day, any conditions, any time mantra of air mobility operations strained the maintenance and repair system required to keep aircraft airborne. The 300 plus C-54 aircraft were utilized at such a rate that maintenance crews were constantly performing unscheduled and scheduled maintenance.¹²⁰ The repairs were done in all weather conditions with spare parts that were flown in from the United States in other mobility aircraft, much like today’s operations. Additionally, every 200 (100 round trips to West Berlin) flying hours, C-54s were required to undergo an inspection in Burtonwood United Kingdom to remove the soot and grime from transporting the heating coal for in the residents of West Berlin.¹²¹ The personnel, equipment and support infrastructure for an air mobility operation such as the Berlin Airlift was very expensive for United States taxpayers. That characteristic remains the same today. That is why decision makers must understand the costs associated with utilizing MAF in the

¹¹⁶ Halvorsen, 149.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 161.

¹¹⁸ Aviation Operations Magazine, 4.

¹¹⁹ Tunner, 222.

¹²⁰ Launius and Cross, 36.

¹²¹ Tunner, 86.

implementation of foreign policy. In the case of the Berlin Airlift, Western powers and the people of the United States deemed the effort worth the cost.

After 462 days of sustained airlift, on May 12, 1949, the Soviet blockade lifted and supplies began to flow into Berlin via ground transport.¹²² The airlift set the stage for a negotiated settlement through diplomacy, averting the option of direct military action or Western abandonment that would have otherwise occurred. Over 2.3 million tons of materials were transported on 277,685 flights. In the effort to protect the freedom of West Berlin, thirty-one Americans lost their lives.¹²³ According to an essay published by the United States Centennial of Flight Commission, the victory of airlift in West Berlin resulted in gratitude that still survives. In 1959, the people of West Berlin started the Berlin Airlift Foundation to assist the families of the British and American men killed during the operation. Additionally, during the 50th anniversary celebration of the airlift, German citizens signed parachutes for American airlifts to other parts of the world.”¹²⁴

The Berlin Airlift demonstrated that MAF could produce enduring peace by enabling United States foreign policy following combat operations against a former enemy. Additionally, the Berlin Airlift showed that an element of the hard power military could influence foreign policy via soft power operations. The United States foreign policy of communist containment was born out of the Berlin Airlift and MAF were the method of choice to enact that policy. This early demonstration of the potential to influence other nations with non-lethal military operations has laid the groundwork for MAF to make a significant and lasting hybrid power impact to foreign policy. The next section discusses the relationship between MAF doctrine and the military’s interaction with United States foreign policy.

¹²² Feltus, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/berlin_airlift/AP35.htm. Miller, X.

¹²³ Historical Berlin Airlift Foundation, *The Berlin Airlift* <http://www.spiritoffreedom.org/airlift.html> (accessed February 10, 2010).

¹²⁴ Feltus.

SECTION THREE: FOREIGN POLICY, DOCTRINE & CURRENT OPERATIONS

We have learned and must not forget that from now on air transport is an essential element of airpower, in fact of all national power.

- General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Chief Army Air Forces, 1945

This section analyzes how modern military doctrine and missions interact with foreign policy. A cross-check of the integration of foreign policy in current Air Force and Joint MAF doctrine identifies the United States military’s recognition of MAF capabilities in the foreign policy realm. The last part of this section looks at recent operations that MAF executed and the impact of those operations to foreign policy. The operations discussed are: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM humanitarian daily ration airdrops, and the 2005 Pakistani earthquake relief. This analysis is useful in determining the actual extent of MAF involvement in foreign policy and the lessons learned.

MAF Doctrine and Hybrid Power

Military doctrine establishes the basis for interagency coordination and military involvement in foreign policy.¹²⁵ As such, the relationship between military forces and foreign policy is framed by doctrine. In the case of MAF, there are two-capstone level doctrine documents used to describe the interaction, tenets and composition of United States air mobility forces. Joint Publication (JP) 3-17, *“Air Mobility Operations”* is relatively current, released in Oct 2009. The USAF’s Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6 *“Air Mobility Operations”* is several year old, dated Mar 2006. An additional document, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, provides MAF with a vision for how joint forces of the future will operate in response to forecasted security challenges.¹²⁶ This analysis looks at each of these documents to determine how well air mobility doctrine integrates hybrid power and what doctrinally forecasted role MAF has in the future of foreign policy.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations*, provides a thorough description of the organization, command and control, mission areas and planning requirements for the employment of

¹²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.

¹²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Version 3.0* (Washington D.C.: 2009), iii.

MAF forces. USAF doctrine supports the fact that MAF are a fixed global asset with multiple competing users and managing those assets requires a highly refined prioritization system.¹²⁷ Additionally, USAF doctrine provides a detailed account of the methods and procedures used by MAF in the performance of their duties.

There are two significant limiting factors that AFDD 2-6 specifically mentions about the employment of MAF forces. Reduced global infrastructure is the first. The reduction of forward deployed overseas bases following the Cold War has resulted in fewer locations for MAF to conduct operations. To counter the reduction in overseas infrastructure, the USAF built a system called the Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS).¹²⁸ The forces associated with GAMSS perform functions at large fixed bases and small temporary enroute locations, providing the support necessary to conduct rapid global mobility. The challenges that the GAMSS face comes from being the first Air Force (and potentially American) presence on a newly gained airfield.¹²⁹ They must build the capacity, sometimes from scratch, that MAF needs to operate effectively. Capacity building can take a vast amount of time, energy and money—all of which comes at a cost to the American taxpayer. The second factor affecting the availability of MAF is the limited number of assets (aircraft and crew) available to conduct the full range of air mobility operations. The hybrid power nature of MAF's daily activities; from airdropping ammunition and equipment to troops engaged in combat to transporting earthquake rescue teams to disaster areas, creates foreign policy options that would not exist otherwise. The flexibility and versatility that MAF provides military commanders and civilian leaders ensures that they will stay in high demand.

A key planning consideration of many overseas MAF operations is the diplomatic clearance (or dip clearance) required to operate in foreign nations. These clearances include aircraft overflight, landing

¹²⁷ Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document, 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2006), ix.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 56.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 64.

rights, personnel visas, communications connection approval and numerous other entry requirements.¹³⁰

The ability for MAF to provide disaster response or show the United States flag on foreign soil is greatly hampered without the approval of the affected or enroute countries. Although air-refueling aircraft provide the option of flying around a nation that does not allow overflight, lack of diplomatic clearances can still impact the size of forces, throughput of personnel/material and ultimately operational success. On the other side of this issue is the fact that requirements for overflight often require that United States diplomats interface with foreign governments to acquire the necessary clearances, thus providing an impetus for dialogue that might not otherwise exist.

One aspect that is missing from AFDD 2-6 is the actual integration MAF has with other elements used to implement United States foreign policy. This integration happens regularly in today's interagency operating environment, but USAF doctrine does not directly address how it takes place, how MAF integrate with Other Government Agencies/Non-Governmental Agencies or its importance in the implementation of foreign policy. The airlift chapter is the only section that touches on how MAF interacts with foreign policy in non-lethal operations. This chapter recognizes the potential for military commanders to employ MAF forces across the full range of "military operations" by stating:

"United States leaders rely upon the Air Force's air mobility capability to reduce human suffering by transporting essential medical supplies, food, shelters, water, and other material"¹³¹

Additionally, Air Force air mobility doctrine contains several vignettes describing successful non-lethal operations that MAF participated in around the world. Other than the previously discussed reference and vignettes, USAF doctrine is void of the soft and hybrid power potential MAF has in the implementation of foreign policy. Additionally, there is no mention of how non-DoD agencies secure airlift for counterdrug operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, etc. The Economy Act and Stafford Act, are the gateway for non-DoD agencies to utilize MAF capabilities. The absence of this linkage speaks to the hard

¹³⁰ Communication connection approval is a term used to describe the data and voice links required for aircraft to be controlled by civilian agencies within their airspace. For more information see Joint Chiefs of Staff, VI-11.

¹³¹ Department of the Air Force, 28.

power centric understanding the USAF has about MAF employment—not the hybrid power potential MAF has in influencing foreign policy.

Joint Publication 3-17 is the overarching authoritative document that describes the roles, missions, and C2 of MAF's integration in the joint operational environment. The vast majority of the information contained in this recently released publication is a carbon copy of what is contained in AFDD 2-6.¹³² However, it does provide a good description of the overall purpose of MAF: "Air mobility operations are a rapid means to project and sustain power across the globe in support of United States national interests and a critical enabler to the United States National Military Strategy."¹³³ This description recognizes the potential that MAF has in the implementation of foreign policy, but it does not speak to the non-lethal impacts MAF has on a daily basis.

In JP 3-17, there are few links to the non-lethal operations MAF conduct and their contribution on United States foreign policy. Surprisingly, there are no references to the concepts of soft or smart power anywhere in the document, even though MAF activities are widely cited as examples of both in many foreign policy documents. As previously mentioned, the Department of State codified smart power as the espoused United States foreign policy methodology as early as May 2009. The Joint Publication was released in October 2009, seemingly adequate time to integrate the whole of government strategy. This oversight is illustrative of the systemic lack of integration of non-lethal military capabilities in the implementation of foreign policy—doctrine focuses on the hard power role the military has traditionally held in foreign policy. Another example of the minimal level of doctrinal integration MAF has with foreign policy is the description of how MAF forces are tasked to perform their various missions. There is a detailed description of how military commanders gain access to MAF capabilities, including the usage of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process.¹³⁴ However, there is only a brief mention of how non-DoD agencies gain access to MAF. The focus of the explanation is the Economy Act

¹³² JP 3-17, *Doctrine for Air Mobility Operations*, 2009 was released only 5 months after this monograph was written, compared to AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility*, 2006 which was 3+ years old at the time of this writing.

¹³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, ix.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, I-5.

(Title 31 USC Sections 1535 and 1536). It explains, ~~no~~ federal agency can request the support of another, provided that the requested services cannot be obtained more cheaply or conveniently by contract.”¹³⁵ There is no description of the actual interface non-DoD agencies have and the tone appears to discourage the use of MAF by any agency other than the DoD.

Another omission in JP 3-17 is the capability of MAF forces to airdrop humanitarian and disaster relief materials into areas lacking suitable airfields. The description of airdrop provided is combat support centric stating, ~~This~~ [airdrop] enables commanders to project combat power.”¹³⁶ The ability for airdrop to meet non-combat related needs has been demonstrated numerous times, as in Post-WWII Germany and modern Afghanistan. By not articulating the capability for airdrop in humanitarian operations, joint doctrine fails to capitalize on a significant tool available to conduct hybrid power operations that could positively affect foreign policy.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) describes the CJCS vision for how joint forces will operate during 2016-2028. The document has numerous references to the capabilities that MAF will be required to perform in the future. The first is the ability to conduct and sustain joint operations at global distances. This capability, demonstrated daily by MAF, is vital to the United States’ ability to project power, and American values to people around the world. Another future requirement addressed is the need for engagement activities that improve the capabilities and cooperation of United States partners.¹³⁷ MAF employed on hybrid power missions are vital to this requirement because they often participate directly in engagement activities by their mere presence. Positive engagement of partner nations by Mobility Air Forces provides simultaneous complementary synergies between soft and hard power that are otherwise unachievable.

The CCJO lacks a clear depiction of the non-lethal military forces ability to shape the global narrative by participating in activities that build positive perceptions of United States actions and motives. In fact, it states that in the future, ~~P~~ervasive visual images of human suffering can create pressures to

¹³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, IV-12.

¹³⁶ Ibid, I-4.

¹³⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14-16.

divert joint forces to humanitarian activities...that could degrade combat readiness before battle and risk outright failure.”¹³⁸ At first glance, this statement appears to discourage the use of the military for humanitarian activities. Instead, it serves as a warning that an over emphasis on soft power activities can dull the blade that the United States military must have to effectively fight and win future lethal conflicts. MAF activities take exception to this assertion. The daily missions MAF executes involve extensive hybrid power activities; for example, conducting humanitarian activities, actually improves their capabilities to support combat operations. Often times, getting critical materials and personnel into areas suffering from natural or manmade disasters are as challenging, if not more challenging, than the activities associated with combat air mobility. The net effect is a crew better prepared to participate in high threat combat operations.

The chairman’s combined concept recognizes that in the future, America will find it necessary to respond to a variety of civil crises by acting to relieve human suffering and supporting civil authorities to restore civil functioning. This translates into the type of influence that hybrid power foreign policy advocates and it is directly applicable to MAF capabilities. A second order effect of MAF forces responding to relieve human suffering is the informational value that accompanies those actions. When a C-17 transports a sick or injured person from their country to life saving medical facilities in the United States, such as what happened in 2010 following the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the attitudes and perceptions of global citizens are shaped.¹³⁹ The result of this type of intervention, accompanied with effective strategic communications, aids in creating conditions that result in greater support for United States activities around the globe.

Overall, Joint and USAF doctrine does not adequately capture the impact MAF have in the performance of hybrid power used to implement United States foreign policy. Additionally, doctrine fails to capture MAF’s ability to influence one of the biggest challenges the United States will face in the future; overcoming negative perceptions about American intentions and methods. Air Mobility doctrine

¹³⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5.

¹³⁹ Derek Kaufman, *Air Force team cares for Haiti victims in flight* (January 27, 2010), <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=2107> (accessed March 7, 2010).

addresses the limitations and challenges associated with MAF operations. This is important because understanding limitations and challenges informs decision makers of the potential for success or failure when MAF are used to enact foreign policy. The CCJO is very clear that military global engagement and response to human suffering will be key components in the future and MAF has direct applicability to those areas. The hybrid power that MAF are capable of not only demonstrates the strength and versatility of the United States military, but also the compassion for others that is an underlying component of American society. The following section analyzes several MAF operations since September 2001 that are representative of hybrid power foreign policy. This analysis looks at positive and negative aspects and the first and second order effects of those operations.

Non-Lethal (Hybrid Power) MAF Operations since 11 September, 2001

Two modern examples of MAF's effects on soft, hard and hybrid power are useful in determining the current impact MAF has on foreign policy. The potential hybrid power that MAF brings to the implementation of policy is illustrated in the 2001 Operation ENDURING FREEDOM humanitarian daily ration airdrops and the 2005 Pakistani earthquake relief operations. This analysis is helpful in determining which type of MAF missions have a direct impact on United States foreign policy and what the potential shortfalls and limiting factors are for future hybrid power operations.

On the 7 October, 2001, the opening night of USAF operations over Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001, two C-17s airdropped approximately 35,000 humanitarian rations over eastern and northern Afghanistan.¹⁴⁰ According to Headquarters Air Mobility Command, those two airdrops were the first combat humanitarian airdrops of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). In military operations, combat and humanitarian do not often go together, but in the case of this mission, they connected seamlessly. The combat description is appropriate, because the airspace over the airdrop location was hostile. It was humanitarian, because the materials provided were Humanitarian Daily

¹⁴⁰ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "2001 Year in Review," In *Historical Archives*, by Command Historian, Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, (2001).

Rations (HDR) to non-combatants affected by the conflict.¹⁴¹ Additionally, the airdrop of HDRs occurred only hours after American and Allied forces commenced the aerial bombardment of terrorist targets inside Afghanistan. The combatant commander chose MAF airdrop to satisfy the OEF campaign strategy that required support for the welfare of Afghan civilians simultaneous with combat operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.¹⁴² The airdrops were the first installment of President George W. Bush's \$320 million aid package for the people living inside Afghanistan.¹⁴³

The humanitarian airdrop missions were not only dangerous, but also very complicated. Originating from Ramstein Air Base Germany, C-17s flew more than 6,500 miles round trip and were air refueled multiple times on their 22-hour flights. USAF airlift experts planned the airdrop to occur at 25,000 feet due to the existing surface to air missile threat. This was a first for humanitarian aid, which required that a new delivery system (using a large cardboard container) be developed to drop the rations in a safe, efficient and effective manner.¹⁴⁴ Once rolled out of the back of the aircraft, the boxes quickly broke apart in mid-air and scattered the food parcels over the targeted area. In addition to food being dropped, MAF disbursed leaflets to the intended recipients of the HDRs. These leaflets illustrated to the Afghan people that the United States was providing their sustenance and that the food was prepared in accordance with the Koran. (Illustration Two) Overall, 2,423,700 HDRs were airdropped by MAF aircraft in an effort to support United States unconventional ground forces' efforts designed to gain support from the civilian population.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Boston Globe reported that the cost per HDR meal was \$4.50. Elizabeth A. Neuffer, "Afghan Food Drops Found To Do Little Good," *Boston Globe*, March 26, 2002: A1. Total cost of the HDRs airdropped the first year was \$50,897,769. Bernd McConnell, "United States Governemnt Humanitarian Assistance to Central Asia," *Relief Web*, (January 11, 2002) [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2002.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/ACOS-64BETR-usaid_afg_11jan.pdf/\\$File/usaid_afg_11jan.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2002.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/ACOS-64BETR-usaid_afg_11jan.pdf/$File/usaid_afg_11jan.pdf) (accessed March 14, 2010).

¹⁴² Captain Dani Johnson, "A Look Back at OEF HUMRO – The Planning," *USAFE News Service*, November 11, 2002, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/11/mil-021103-amc01.htm> (accessed March 14, 2010).

¹⁴³ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office.

¹⁴⁴ Johnson, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/11/mil-021103-amc01.htm>.

¹⁴⁵ Bernd, [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2002.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/ACOS-64BETR-usaid_afg_11jan.pdf/\\$File/usaid_afg_11jan.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2002.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/ACOS-64BETR-usaid_afg_11jan.pdf/$File/usaid_afg_11jan.pdf).

Illustration Two – HDR Leaflet¹⁴⁶



Leaflet Number: AFD16g, *Psychological Operations in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom*

Unfortunately, the HDR missions were not as successful as planners had hoped. A report written by a retired Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel for the non-governmental agency Partners International Foundation, documented several shortcomings of the operation. Those shortcomings included an incomplete understanding of the long-term concerns of the Afghans, failure of numerous ration containers to maintain their integrity during airdrop operations, and the inclusion of non-edible moisture absorbent packets to the meals.¹⁴⁷ The result was the consumption of both contaminated food and non-edible materials. The first shortcoming occurred because planners failed to understand how the Afghans were going to use the materials. Food was scarce in Northern Afghanistan and winter was about to begin, resulting in many Afghans storing the food for future consumption. According to Benjamin Sklaver, a law and diplomacy graduate student at Tufts University, "(HDRs) are meant to feed a population for a very short period--days to weeks at most. They enhance food security simply by putting a

¹⁴⁶ On October 29, 2001, the United States Government airdropped this leaflet image. When turned over, the leaflet shows the Afghan tearing open the packet. The word "Halal" is at the upper right of the reverse side to show that the food was prepared in accordance with the Koran. The final illustration shows the Afghan sitting with his entire family and enjoying the feast sent by the Americans. The leaflet is clearly designed for illiterate Afghans and shows them what to do with the yellow packets found on the ground. Sergeant Major Herbert A. Friedman, "Psychological Operations in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001," *Psywar.Org*, <http://www.psywar.org/afghanistan.php> (accessed March 13, 2010).

¹⁴⁷ Partners International Foundation Humanitarian Assistance and Assessment Team travelled to Afghanistan and completed what is recognized as the first and only known objective "ground" assessment of the United States Department of Defense's program to air drop Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR) to feed displaced persons. Partners International Foundation, *Published Partners International Foundation Reports*, November 2001, <http://www.partners-international.org/Library%20&%20Glossary/Reports/Reports.htm> (accessed March 14, 2010).

packet of food in the hands of malnourished recipients.”¹⁴⁸ The meals were designed to be consumed upon discovery, not as a food store for future sustenance. Additionally, Special Forces attached to the geographic area discovered that many of the packages were damaged during delivery and the food inside had spoiled. Another shortcoming was the usage of desiccant sachets, a material used to preserve freshness and reduce moisture in food. These packages were included in the packets with instructions graphically depicted (circle with a line through it) not to eat.¹⁴⁹ The report cited that up to thirty-five Afghans complained of being ill after eating the substance.

An element of the operation not considered by planners was the risk of the HDRs falling into areas containing unexploded ordinance. The yellow color of the HDRs added to that risk. Sources at Oxfam International, a multi-national aid and human right organization, publicly stated in an interview with CBS that there was a danger that Afghans attempting to recover the food could mistakenly enter one of the countries numerous mined areas.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, while MAF transports delivered yellow HDRs, United States combat aircraft were delivering another yellow package in Afghanistan, the BLU 92 cluster bomb. Creating a potentially hazardous situation for those that saw yellow objects in open fields. To mitigate this risk, United States forces transmitted messages in Persian and Pashto warning Afghans of the potential for confusion and how to identify whether or not the yellow object is a bomb or food.¹⁵¹ The second order effect of the confusion between food and bombs was the reduced usage of the BLU 92 by order of the DoD. Additionally, a DoD press release covered by Reuters discussed the potential for confusion, resulting in producing negative strategic communications for the United States effort.¹⁵² In order to prevent this confusion in the future, the DoD directed that HDR packaging color changed from yellow to salmon.

¹⁴⁸ Benjamin A. Sklaver, "Humanitarian Daily Rations," *The Fletcher School, Tufts University*, (Spring 2003), <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2003/benjaminsklaver.pdf> (accessed March 14, 2010).

¹⁴⁹ Neuffer, A.I.

¹⁵⁰ Dan Harris, "Experts: Food Airdrops Not an Ideal Way to Deliver Nourishment to the Needy," *ABC News*, (October 9, 2001), <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80499&page=1> (accessed March 15, 2010).

¹⁵¹ Deborah Zabarenko, "United States Warns Afghans of Yellow Cluster Bomblets." *Reuters*, (2001): accessible at <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1029-07.htm>.

¹⁵² Zabarenko.

MAF airdrop in Afghanistan continued past the initial effort in 2001. For example, in March 2006 a single C-17 Globemaster III airdropped 32,400 pounds of humanitarian goods to four locations in central and eastern Afghanistan.¹⁵³ According to the AMC Historian, this mission set an airdrop record by delivering the most cargo to multiple drop zones in the shortest amount of time in the history of United States MAF operations. Airdrop after the initial effort did not just consist of HDRs, bundles of supplies that contained food, blankets, winter survival gear, and school supplies were also delivered.¹⁵⁴

The initial intent behind the airdrop was to feed Afghans located in hard to reach areas in northern areas of the country. Overall, MAF efforts were successful; people were fed and the local and global message of United States compassion for non-combatant Afghans was transmitted. This clearly occurred with 2.5 million HDRs delivered during the initial days of the operation. MAF airdrop was not the desired delivery method for food and other vital supplies, but the nonexistent ground transportation systems and austere location of the people in need drove the requirement for airdrop. However, having the capability to conduct those types of operations proved vital at the time to the overall United States strategy of defeating the support base for the terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. The hybrid power demonstrated by this operation ushered in an innovative way to combat an enemy while at the same time, winning the perception and information war. Clearly, there were mistakes made by planners in the understanding of the complexities of the environment. However, adjustments to humanitarian airdrop took place and the lessons learned are invaluable to future hybrid power operations. Hybrid power is demonstrated in this operation as military forces were used to perform non-lethal activities to win over foreign peoples through attraction versus coercion.

Much like the CBI airlift operations, the previous example illustrates MAF's hybrid power contribution to foreign policy in a combat environment. The second example elucidates MAF's contribution to hybrid power in a non-combat environment: a mission performed by MAF that harnesses both soft and hard power simultaneously. On 8 October 2005, the worst natural disaster in the history of

¹⁵³ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "2006 Year in Review, " in *Historical Archives*, by Command Historian, Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, (2006).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

Pakistan occurred when a massive earthquake shook the Kashmir region, killing at least 86,000 and injuring another 70,000 people.¹⁵⁵ The area destroyed by the quake measured 62 miles by 186 miles and resulted in 2.8 million people homeless just before winter.¹⁵⁶ The disaster quickly exceeded the government of Pakistan's capabilities, and they requested international assistance. Many nations, including the United States rallied to help and the operation, dubbed Operation LIFELINE by the United States government began.

Within just two days of the earthquake, the first relief supplies from the United States arrived via MAF at Chaklala Air Base, Pakistan, a nine-hour drive from the earthquakes epicenter.¹⁵⁷ A United States C-17 from Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan transported nearly 45 short tons of food, water, blankets, medicine and a forklift to aid in rescue and recovery efforts.¹⁵⁸ The next day, US efforts to support Pakistan really took off with the arrival of the 818th Contingency Response Group (CRG). A CRG is one of the elements of the Air Mobility Support Forces highlighted during the discussion about the composition of MAF. They function as a self-contained MAF rapid reaction force that deploys to perform base opening and prepare the base for around-the-clock air operations.¹⁵⁹ The CRG is often the first large group (approximately 100 members) of United States military personnel on the ground during contingency operations. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake, the CRG coordinated the arrival and distribution of humanitarian assistance cargo sent there by the US government and many other nations. Commanded by Colonel Richard Walberg, the CRG immediately set off to build an Air Base with approximately 100 short tons of equipment that included cargo loaders, communication equipment, generators, and vehicles. The volume of humanitarian aid flying into Chaklala grew rapidly and according

¹⁵⁵ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "Earthquake Strikes Northern Pakistan and India, Killing more than 25,000," *In Facts on File*, by Command Historian, (Scott AFB: Air Mobility Command, 2005), 701. United States Geological Survey, *Earthquake Hazards Program, Magnitude 7.6 – Pakistan*, (October 8, 2005), <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2005/usdya/#summary> (accessed March 15, 2010).

¹⁵⁶ Jim Garamone, *Pace Tours Earthquake-Ravaged Area of Pakistan*, (March 21, 2006), http://osd.dtic.mil/news/Mar2006/20060321_4564.html (accessed March 14, 2010).

¹⁵⁷ AMC Historian, 2005 Year in Review.

¹⁵⁸ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "Pakistan Earthquake Relief: 818 Contingency Response Group Deploys to Support Operation LIFELINE," *In 2005 Year in Review*, by Command Historian, (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2005), 128.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 146.

to Colonel Walberg, —The Pakistanis were simply overwhelmed by the colossal scale of relief required in the disaster area.”¹⁶⁰ By 11 October, the first C-17 from the continental United States arrived and the CRG established twenty-four-hour operations facilitating the arrival, offloading and onward movement of humanitarian supplies from the United States, Europe and the Middle East.¹⁶¹

Following the unloading of airlifted humanitarian goods, trucks and helicopters were reloaded by the CRG in order to move those goods the last 100 miles to the areas hit the hardest.¹⁶² Early in the effort, the United States Army CH-47 Chinook was the mainstay in the effort to move materials forward, as many of the land routes were impassable. The role that the Chinook played in the airlift cannot be understated, Col Walberg declared, —the Army Chinook helicopter became for the Pakistanis the symbol of the international relief effort.”¹⁶³ Eventually, the roads were cleared and the CRG’s Airmen loaded 587 trucks with much needed life saving materials.

At the time of the earthquake, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan was Ryan C. Crocker (later the United States Ambassador to Iraq during the 2007 surge operations). Ambassador Crocker believed that it was —absolutely essential” that America’s involvement in assisting the earthquake victims was known around the world.¹⁶⁴ To accomplish this strategic communication goal, the CRG tasked their Public Affairs Officer to ensure that the 100+ global media representatives were getting the story as it developed. The typical measure of —short ton” used to gauge airlift effectiveness was failing to provide the level of detail needed by Ambassador Crocker to communicate the enormity and positive impact that the airlift was having on the Muslim perception of the United States operation. To solve this problem,

¹⁶⁰ Colonel Richard Walberg, *818 Contingency Response Group Responds to Pakistan Earthquake, Oct - Dec 2005*, After Action Briefing to the Commander of Air Mobility Command, Gen Duncan McNabb, (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command Historian's Office), register Number SD 2046, 2006.

¹⁶¹ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, "Pakistan Earthquake Relief: 818 Contingency Response Group Deploys to Support Operation LIFELINE," In *2005 Year in Review*, by Command Historian, (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2005), 130.

¹⁶² Ibid, 135

¹⁶³ Colonel Richard Walberg, register Number SD 2046, 2006.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 139.

CRG leadership converted the “short ton” method into broken down totals by types of humanitarian cargo: tents, blankets, boxes of water and food, etc. (Table One)¹⁶⁵

Table One

Boxes by type of cargo offloaded from United States aircraft at Chaklala Air Base, Pakistan
(11 October 2005 – 12 December 2005)

Category of Cargo	Number of Boxes
Food	7,263
Medicine	8,257
Tents	5,162
Bottled Water	1,587
Blankets	12,957
Clothing	385
Sleeping Bags	4,650
Tarpaulins	5,566
Flooring for Tents	285
Total	46,112 Boxes of Humanitarian Goods ¹⁶⁶

Ambassador Crocker’s involvement and understanding of the Muslim mind was key to energizing other governmental agencies participation and in recognizing that earthquake relief was a good venue to illustrate United States goodwill toward the Muslim community. Hybrid power was being demonstrated by the humanitarian goods delivered and managed by United States MAF forces. Both the civilian and military leadership maintained that operations were not just humanitarian in nature but also had a significant informational element as well.

The CRG deployed to Pakistan for a total of sixty-four days. In that period, they offloaded 273 United States military and commercial aircraft and assisted with the offload of twenty other nations’ aircraft. The total weight of United States humanitarian goods airlifted during Operation LIFELINE into Pakistan was 15,294,000 pounds (7,647 short tons) in addition to MAF transporting 2,427 passengers.¹⁶⁷ MAF forces also performed three airdrops to deliver goods to difficult places to reach via land transport.


¹⁶⁵ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, *2005 Year in Review*, 142.

¹⁶⁶ Colonel Richard Walberg, register Number SD 2046, 2006: Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, *2005 Year in Review*, 135.

¹⁶⁷ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, *2005 Year in Review*, 147.

While more airdrops could have occurred, the small number actually performed was due to limitations placed by the Pakistan government.¹⁶⁸

From a foreign policy perspective, Operation LIFELINE was a resounding success. MAF transport and materials handling not only saved lives and assisted with reconstruction after the earthquake, but their efforts were critical to the local and regional information campaign as well. Regionally, Pan Arab media carried statements throughout the effort detailing America’s enthusiastic support to Pakistan. Locally, within Pakistan, United States humanitarian efforts were positively received. Chart one shows that public opinion about the United States and terrorist activities changed dramatically in Pakistan following earthquake relief.



©2005 by Terror Free for Tomorrow, Inc. Fieldwork for the Terror Free Tomorrow poll occurred from November 14 to November 28, 2005 throughout Pakistan. Poll accomplished by ACNielsen.

According to the organization Terror Free Tomorrow, for the first time since 9/11, more Pakistanis were favorable to the United States than unfavorable. When asked why, the answer was –American assistance to Pakistani earthquake victims.” Additionally, 78% of Pakistanis surveyed said that American aid has made them feel more favorable to the United States.¹⁷⁰ That change was noted by

¹⁶⁸ Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, *2005 Year in Review*, 148.

¹⁶⁹ Terror Free Tomorrow, *A Dramatic Change of Public Opinion In the Muslim World*, Results from a Poll in Pakistan, Washington D.C.: <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=71>, (2005).

¹⁷⁰ Terror Free Tomorrow, 4.

senior decision makers when the commander of United States Central Command, General John Abizaid stated, —Never in history has such a small group of people made such an historic impact on the impressions of the United States by the Muslim world opinion.”¹⁷¹ All of the components of Mobility Air Forces were utilized during Operation LIFELINE. Air refueling tankers, strategic and tactical airlifters and air mobility support forces all synergized to produce hybrid power effects, resulting in winning over the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I have traveled around the world and talked to people in different countries. I can tell you that when those big —T tail aircraft land, with the American flag on the tail, they not only represent America—they are America.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman (former CSAF)

Smart power theory is the current administration’s foundation for the effective employment of United States foreign policy. The components of smart power include both hard and soft power. Although military forces generally fall into the hard power bucket of smart power, the authors of smart power theory do recognize that certain elements of the military can have soft power effects:

—It should come as no surprise that some of the best-funded and most appreciated soft power tools have been carried out by the United States military such as tsunami relief in Southeast Asia and the earthquake response in Pakistan, since these operations produced results that were clear, measurable and unassailable.”¹⁷²

That said, this monograph analyzed the potential for military forces, MAF in particular, to contribute to foreign policy in ways other than the traditional hard power format. In order to accomplish the analysis, MAF capabilities and contributions were measured against smart power’s five critical areas that the United States must demonstrate to better engage the global community. The analysis showed that MAF do indeed have a part to play within each of these areas, albeit, a small part in the economic integration and climate change areas.

Successful foreign policy is not generally achieved instantly, but is forged over time though

¹⁷¹ Colonel Richard Walberg, register Number SD 2046, 2006: Headquarters Air Mobility Command History Office, *2005 Year in Review*, 135.

¹⁷² Nye & Armitage, 9.

repeated positive interactions and experiences between nations. MAF activities in the CBI theater laid the foundation for MAF to be used as a tool in those interactions and experiences. It also shows that early MAF capabilities had the potential to be used in environments and ways that could benefit both combat actions and diplomatic relations with foreign peoples and governments. The Berlin Airlift was the next significant step MAF took to solidify their role as one of the United States' flexible and adaptable non-lethal foreign policy devices. Not only did MAF perform their required mission of sustaining the city of West Berlin, but they also contributed to the supportive dialogue West Germany had with the United States during the cold war and beyond. The hypothesis of this monograph, that the military, particularly MAF, can contribute both positively and negatively to the hard and soft power elements of foreign policy, is correct. There are numerous other examples of the effects that MAF have had on foreign policy. The negative effects are more prevalent when lethal activities are coupled with non-lethal without regard to the second and third order effects. For example, during the Afghanistan HDR airdrop, many agencies saw the United States activities as a ploy to divert attention away from United States firepower. The mission nearly backfired when flaws to the planning and execution of the airdrop emerged to the public. On the other hand, the positive effects of MAF operations are nearly universally recognized when the United States enters into an environment at the request of the host nation, or for pure soft power reasons, like earthquake and tsunami relief.

The tangible effects MAF has on foreign policy are very difficult to gauge. Often times good foreign relations are akin to measuring when an event does not occur. One notable exception to the challenge of measuring causation was the 1981 Iranian hostage release. In 1980, United States MAF aircraft conducted a humanitarian operation in Algeria following a massive earthquake. The earthquake killed 6,000 people and left 200,000 homeless. The Department of State asked the USAF to airlift relief supplies, resulting in MAF delivering 340 tons during the two-week period following the disaster.¹⁷³ Because good foreign relations are based upon relationships forged on shared experiences, the Algerians

¹⁷³ Military Airlift Command History Office, *Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the Military Airlift Command 1941-1991* (Scott AFB, IL: Headquarters Military Airlift Command, 1991), 173.

volunteered diplomatic and physical assistance vital to the release of the fifty-two American's held hostage in Iran. Not only did the Algerian government advocate for the US position on the release, but they also transported the hostages from Tehran to Algiers.¹⁷⁴ The value of MAF as an instrument of national power was captured in a letter from the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Hans Mark to the commander of MAC, General Dutch Huyser:

—There is no doubt in my mind that our airlift forces are a major method that the United States has for exercising influence abroad...Our help to Algeria after the earthquake there led in turn to their help to us in persuading Iran to release the American prisoners. We could not have assisted the Algerians without our airlift resources."¹⁷⁵

The hypothesis of this monograph also challenged CSIS' categorization of complementary soft and hard power as smart power and asked if there is a better way to approach those activities to further United States foreign policy. Smart power methodology is problematic in two ways: nomenclature and understanding of the tools available for use. The nomenclature is divisive because of the implication that previous foreign policy was not smart. Understanding is flawed due to the placement of United States instruments of national power into specific buckets (military=hard power, culture=soft power). Senior decision makers are missing the synergistic effects that certain instruments have to simultaneously influence both soft and hard power. The term hybrid power better describes how single tools within the military instrument of power can provide the requisite simultaneity needed to influence soft and hard power, producing the greatest effects to foreign policy. There have been numerous occasions when the military's cargo aircraft ferried life saving supplies and equipment to other countries in their time of greatest need. Those countries are not only influenced by the food, water, medical personnel and equipment delivered, but also by the fact that there is an American flag on the tail of those aircraft. While both soft and hard powers are key components of smart power, smart power theory does not allow for the blending of these two elements, but hybrid power does.

Current overseas contingency operations cannot be successful by lethal activities alone. The right

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 172.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 173.

mix of non-lethal and threat of, or actual use of lethal methods will be necessary. Every 90 seconds of every day, a USAF controlled MAF aircraft takes off or lands somewhere on the globe. The global presence of United States military aircraft has profound effects on the formulation and execution of foreign policy. On a single mission, a strategic airlift aircraft can ferry combat troops to their war-fighting destination, while offloading precious humanitarian supplies to feed and clothe civilians in the conflict zone. Air refueling platforms (tankers) also operate within the hard and soft realm of smart power. Again, on a single mission, tankers can refuel combat aircraft while transporting our nation's diplomats to key summits for international cooperation. The hybrid power contribution does not end when the life saving supplies, or United States diplomats depart the aircraft, the United States flag is prominently displayed on the tail of mobility aircraft for all that pass by to see that America brings hope, not just intimidation to their country. One way to improve upon this diplomatic opportunity is to establish a formal training program that teaches MAF aircrew about the customs of the region and how to best represent America while there, similar to the courses offered at the Department of States' Foreign Service Institute.¹⁷⁶ This training program would prepare a large force of —Additional Duty” Foreign Service Officers that interact with foreign nationals on a daily basis.

In the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that while military forces may be employed in benign ways in numerous situations, these uses should not be allowed to imperil the military's ability to wage war.¹⁷⁷ This truism must be considered when MAF are tasked to employ hybrid power operations designed to influence global opinion about United States activities. That said, the contributions MAF make to foreign policy are so important that further study on whether other governmental organizations, particularly the DoS and USAID, should acquire an indigenous capacity for airlift outside of the DoD. Another area of study would be to determine

¹⁷⁶ The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is the Federal Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the United States foreign affairs community. At the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the FSI provides more than 450 courses -- including some 70 foreign languages -- to more than 50,000 enrollees a year from the State Department and more than 40 other government agencies and the military service branches. United States State Department, *Foreign Service Institute*, <http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/> (accessed January 28, 2010).

¹⁷⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1.

the foreign policy effects of using contracted or commercial carriers in lieu of MAF aircraft. Could commercial or contracted carriers meet the time critical nature of those missions and are they able to operate to and from the sometimes-required austere locations? Additionally, will the foreign policy effects be the same when foreign nations see a non-United States government aircraft delivering materials?

This monograph is not a comprehensive document detailing all of the potential types and levels of involvement that the United States military has on hybrid power foreign policy; the topic deserves additional research. Further study to determine the contributions that other elements of the military, such as Civil Affairs, Medical Corps and Theater Security Cooperation might have on implementing hybrid power foreign policy is warranted. Along a different vein, hard power will continue to be requisite for the United States to maintain its position in the global community; too much soft power could undermine that position. A detailed analysis of the opportunity costs associated with the procurement and employment of MAF versus other instruments of national power would be useful in determining the proper mix of those capabilities.

Even emerging global superpowers are influenced by MAF's hybrid power. Immediately following the 2008 Sichuan region earthquake in China, United States MAF were immediately on the scene delivering humanitarian aid. China's cabinet and Xinhua news agency reported that the two United States MAF missions were the first humanitarian aid donated by foreign military forces, totaling 1.6 million dollars.¹⁷⁸ The United States is the only nation on earth with the capacity to provide rapid global air mobility anywhere, anytime. There are certain to be many future opportunities for that capability to influence and shape foreign policy and relations. United States hybrid power activities are key to achieving the enduring peace that all foreign policy activities seek, or as Sir Basil Liddell Hart put it, the —Site of peace that lies beyond every war.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Staff Writers, Chengdu, China (AFP), *United States Military Planes Deliver aid to Quake-hit China*, (May 18, 2008) http://www.terraily.com/reports/US_military_planes_deliver_aid_to_quake-hit_China_999.html (accessed September 19, 2009).

¹⁷⁹ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), X.

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